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Abstract 
This study examined the role of the Benefits Fraud and Compliance Act (BFCA) in affecting 
H1B hiring policy in the state of Virginia, as it pertained to seven computer science-related 
occupations. By employing an independent samples t-test approach, it was discovered that there 
was a statistically significant difference in H1B actual wages, proposed wages, and per-employer 
offers before and after BFCA.     
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Background of the Problem 
 In the United States, the H1B Visa program determines the conditions under which 
foreign workers can be employed. The purpose of the H1B program is twofold: (a) To ensure 
that American employers in any sector comply with existing federal law when hiring foreign 
workers and (b) to ensure that both American and foreign workers obtain opportunities to work 
in their sectors. The H1B Visa program creates an exemption for a fixed number of foreign 
workers to work in the United States, thus allowing American employers access to a global labor 
pool and also ensuring that some number of jobs in the United States will always be reserved for 
American workers, given that the H1B Visa cap always represents a small percentage of the total 
jobs available in the United States at any given time. Most H1B jobs are in the technology 
industry.  
 Labor regulation theory indicates that no government ever enjoys perfect control of a 
labor market through the use of legislation and policy enforcement. In the U.S., for example, 
there have been many documented cases of H1B Visa program violations (Rodino-Colocino, 
2006). For example, fraudulent (or simply negligent) employers can hire H1B Visa holders 
beyond the terms of their entry visa, pay H1B Visa holders a wage that is lower than prevailing 
standards, or even blackmail H1B Visa holders to perform certain kinds of work for free. There 
has been a perception, at least among certain employers, that H1B Visa holders are a vulnerable 
population who can be coerced into accepting illegal conditions (Nwokocha, 2008). At times, 
H1B Visa holders have also been in violation of the laws, for example by working with so-called 
shell employers in order to get fraudulent entry visas (Burgoon, Fine, Jacoby, & Tichenor, 2010).  
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 When H1B Visa policy is violated, several parties suffer. First, H1B Visa holders 
themselves suffer, as they might find themselves accepting low wages, doing free work, or 
otherwise having to endure sub-standard labor conditions. American workers suffer because, if 
there is a pool of exploitable H1B Visa workers, then there is a reduced incentive for employers 
to hire Americans at prevailing market rates. Finally, society as a whole suffers, in that criminal 
hiring and labor practices create negative externalities that have to be shouldered by law 
enforcement, local communities, and many other people whose lives are in some touched by the 
hiring practices of American employers (Araujo, 2009).  
 The United States government has demonstrated an awareness of the problems that arise 
from violations of the H1B Visa program, and has tasked numerous resources towards the 
enforcement of this program (Sherrill, 2011). Most recently, the United States passed legislation 
in the form of the Benefit Fraud and Compliance Assessment (BFCA) policy of 2006 in order to 
more carefully monitor American employers of H1B Visa holders. BFCA has been on the books 
for half a decade and is ripe for a formative assessment. Existing economic and labor data makes 
it possible to determine whether, by numerous standards, BFCA has been a success. The purpose 
of this study is to examine the impact of BFCA on the technology labor market in the U.S. state 
of Virginia, for which no summative or formative assessment of BFCA has been conducted by 
either academic or government researchers.  
 The research questions posed by this study are as follows: How has the advent of the 
BFCA impacted the tempo of H1B hiring in Virginia? How has the advent of the BFCA 
influenced prevailing H1B wages in Virginia? How has the advent of the BFCA influenced 
employer-proposed H1B wages in Virginia? These questions will be analyzed through the 
theoretical lenses of Pigou (2001)[1932], who argued that the threat of government sanction is 
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likely to bring about changes in organizational behavior (such as changes in wage rates), and of 
Coase (1960), who argued that free-market, profit-maximizing negotiation is more efficacious 
than the threat of sanction in determining organizational behavior. The research methodology is 
quantitative, and draws upon an analysis of the pre- and post-BFCA states of H1B hiring tempo, 
actual wages, and employer-proposed wages. The research assumption is that, as per Pigou’s 
(2001)[1932] prediction, it is likely that H1B employers in Virginia are paying more and 
proposed to pay more to H1B employees, to forestall the threat of government sanction; and that, 
as per Coase’s (1960) prediction, H1B employers are insulating their profits by hiring less H1B 
employees. In other words, it is predicted that the federal government was successful in 
modifying the behavior of H1B employers through the threat of the sanction, but also that the 
H1B employers are taking advantage of free-market mechanisms (such as the freedom to hire 
any number of employees) to reduce the loss in profits brought about through higher H1B wages. 
 The remainder of this chapter contains a discussion of the study, with the purpose being 
to introduce the key themes, trends, and theories that are needed to better understand any 
research on BFCA implementation. The subsequent chapters, especially chapter two (the 
literature review), will offer more specific detail on labor policy issues and other matters relating 
to BFCA. This chapter prepares for the way for the greater detail in that discussion. 
Problem Statement 
 A policy can only held to be successful if it is has been subject to rigorous measurement 
and empirical analysis. However, there has not yet been an analysis of whether BFCA has 
worked to reduce the problems associated with non-compliant H1B hiring in Virginia, which is 
home to roughly 15,000 H1B Visa holders a year, most of whom work in the technology sector 
(H1B Visa Data, 2011, no page number). Without an analysis of the success or failure of BFCA, 
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it is impossible to determine whether BFCA ought to audit itself, institute needed changes to the 
program, troubleshoot known weaknesses in the program, or embed and retain its existing 
approach. In other words, the core of the problem is that there is no empirical basis from which 
to assess the success of BFCA on a state-by-state basis. The human dimensions of this problem 
are that, if BFCA happens to be faltering in its stated objectives, the ills associated with H1B 
non-compliance will continue to hurt various segments of the American economy. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of the study is to use quantitative, statistical, correlational, and cross-
sectional methods to assess the success of BFCA in Virginia over select years in the past decade, 
and in so doing to test the hypotheses associated with the study’s research questions. 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 The first research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA impacted the tempo of 
H1B hiring in Virginia? In this research question, the concept of tempo is operationalized as the 
number of hires per employer. The research hypothesis for the first research question is that the 
mean hires per employer in Virginia before BFCA > the mean hires per employer in Virginia 
after BFCA. The research hypothesis represents the presumption that BFCA was successful in 
curtailing rogue H1B hiring across Virginia; by holding employers to stricter standards, it is 
hypothesized that BFCA cut down false or fraudulent H1B hires. The null hypothesis for the first 
research question is that the mean hires per employer in Virginia before BFCA = the mean hires 
per employer in Virginia after BFCA. The alternative hypothesis for the first research question is 
that the mean hires per employer in Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean hires per employer in 
Virginia after BFCA. For the first research question, as for the second and third research 
questions, the before period is construed as the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the last full 
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years in which BFCA was not implemented. 2006 will be skipped, as it was the year in which 
BFCA was actually implemented. The after period will be construed as 2007, 2008, 2009, and 
2010 which are the two full years after the implementation of BFCA. The before and after period 
was chosen with two goals in mind: (a) The number of years in the before and after sample had 
to be equal, so as to facilitate the use of a t-test methodology to test for significance (determined 
by p < .05); and (b) the total number of years in the sample had to be kept small, as hiring in 
most industries changes dynamically based on innovation and the business cycle. Thus, a 
research question that included too many years in the sample would be vulnerable to the risk of 
measuring effects not related to BFCA. Even as it stands, there is a possibility that H1B hiring 
tempo was affected by general business conditions in each of the years in the study. For this 
reason, the figures will be multiplied by a coefficient representing U.S. economic growth in that 
year, so that the secular effects of the business cycle are properly factored into the model.  
 The second research question is: How has the advent of the BFCA influenced prevailing 
H1B wages in Virginia? The research hypothesis associated with the second research question is 
that the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia before BFCA < the mean prevailing H1B wage in 
Virginia after BFCA. The presumption contained in this research hypothesis is that, because 
BFCA would have curtailed the ability of employers to hire H1B employers at lower-than-
prevailing wage rates, the average wage of H1B employees would have gone up in the period 
following the implementation of BFCA. The null hypothesis associated with the second research 
question is that the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia before BFCA = the mean prevailing 
H1B wage in Virginia after BFCA. The alternative hypothesis associated with the second 
research question is that the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean 
prevailing H1B wage in Virginia after BFCA.  
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 The third research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA influenced employer-
proposed H1B wages in Virginia? The research hypothesis associated with this research question 
is that the mean employer-proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA < the mean employer-
proposed wage in Virginia after BFCA. As with the second research question, the presumption 
contained in the research hypothesis is that, in the aftermath of BFCA, American employers were 
obliged to propose higher wages; the second research question is designed to test whether, in 
addition to merely proposing higher wages, American employers also had to pay higher wages in 
fact. The null hypothesis associated with this research question is that the mean employer-
proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA = the mean employer-proposed wage in Virginia after 
BFCA. The alternative hypothesis associated with this research question is that the mean 
employer-proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean employer-proposed wage in 
Virginia after BFCA.  
 In addition to exploring these research questions, the statistical analysis in chapter four 
will also contain open explorations of the data set. In this way, it will be possible not only to 
address the issues raised by this study in a focused manner, but also to illuminate other aspects of 
the BFCA impact on Virginia. One intention of the open statistical analysis that will follow after 
the research questions is to open the door to future researchers who are interested in this data set. 
Research Methodology 
 The methodology of the study is quantitative, in that it is based on measurement, 
statistics, and a stable and objective definition of variables (all of which, according to Creswell, 
2009, differentiate a quantitative from a qualitative methodology). Furthermore, the study is 
correlative and secondary, meaning that it will draw data from existing sources unaffiliated with 
the researcher; no experiment or pseudo-experiment of any kind will be conducted as part of the 
   
7 
research, as the research centers solely on the statistical analysis of data. The method of data 
analysis will be statistical, with the main tool to be the matched pairs t-test. The matched pairs t-
test is a statistical calculation that is used to determine whether any changes in observed mean of 
a ‘before’ versus ‘after’ situation are statistically significant as determined by an Alpha of over 
95% (. For this study, the before and after variables required some further adjustments in order to 
protect the validity and reliability of the analysis. Because hiring is at least partially determined 
by secular conditions in the business cycle, it was necessary to use a coefficient representing 
U.S. economic growth in the year of interest in order to smooth out differences between the 
before and after years in the sample. This procedure, which will be explained in greater depth in 
the third chapter of the study, will be a means of ensuring that the before and after data only 
measures effects that can be traced to the implementation of BFCA. All data analysis in the 
study, unless stated otherwise, will be conducted by means of the SPSS™ 18.0 statistical 
analysis software. 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
 One of the limitations of the study is that only four years before and four after have been 
included in a sample. Traditionally, matched-pairs t-tests are considered more robust if they are 
populated by a larger (N ≈ 30) sample. However, in this case, the use of a large sample would 
create other methodological problems. As explained before, studying patterns in technology 
hiring that stretch out over more than a few years incurs the risks that effects other than those 
caused by regulation will also be measured. Thus, this limitation of the study can also be seen as 
a kind of strength, in that the small sample is more likely to lead to a measurement of the effect 
of BFCA. The study is delimited to the U.S. state of Virginia and also the years 2002, 2003, 
2004, 2005, 2007,  2008, 2009, 2010. The methodology, however, is flexible and can be used by 
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future researchers who are interested in studying the impact of BFCA enforcement in other states 
and for other time periods.   
Theoretical Bases of the Study 
 The main theoretical base of the study is the government action model of the British 
economist Arthur Pigou (2001)[1932], who proposed that the surest means of inducing private-
sector companies to change various aspects of their behavior—including environmental policies, 
labor relations, and other components of organizational behavior—was to impose a regime of 
strict government surveillance and fines. This model, first propounded by Pigou at the end of the 
First World War, was a continuation of the work of the pioneering economic Alfred Marshall 
(1890) and also proved to be highly influential on the interventionist economic and regulatory 
theories of John Maynard Keynes (2006). Thus, Pigou represents the strain in modern economic 
thinking that prioritizes the use of government observation and punishment as the basis for 
behavioral reform in the private sector, which is exactly the paradigm followed by BFCA. 
 It should be noted that Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theory has for many years been in 
opposition to the market-driven theory of Coase (1960). Coase suggested that, instead of 
employing government as a means of altering the economic behavior of private organizations, 
the better approach was to let the market sort out its own harmful effects. Both Pigou’s theory 
and Coase’s theory have found influential supporters in American political and economic theory 
of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, with the laissez faire position identified by Coase serving as the 
basis for Republican and libertarian policies of regulation and the stricter position identified by 
Pigou serving as the inspiration for the more interventionist turn in U.S. regulatory policies 
(Green, 2009). 
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 However, in terms of the labor market, Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theory emerged triumphant 
among the American policy establishment. Today, there is little controversy over whether 
government ought to be responsible for setting and enforcing the minimum wage, serving as the 
guarantor of proper conditions, and otherwise regulating labor laws. American policy theorists 
who have argued for laissez faire approaches have been marginalized, both as academic theorists 
and as sources for policy inspiration.  
 Pigou (2001)[1932] suggested that government was highly likely to be successful in 
instigating private sector change if it could succeed in identifying and punishing a sufficiently 
high number of violations. The proof of government diligence in this regard, Pigou argued, 
would come in observable changes of behavior. Once-polluted waterways would become less 
polluted, for example, as government successfully cracked down on industrial dumpers. Thus, 
while Pigou’s theory is certainly rooted in abstract ethical principles about the role and duty of 
the government—to employers, employees, and the environment—it also has an empirical focus. 
The success of a Pigouvian approach to regulation is, so to speak, in the pudding, which it is why 
it is appropriate to examine labor market statistics as a way of determining whether the U.S. 
government has been effective with BFCA. 
 If Pigou (2001)[1932] was right, then it should be expected that H1B employers in 
Virginia did in fact raise their actual and proposed H1B wages in order to be in compliance with 
the law. Pigou’s theory implies that, the more credible the threat of government sanction, the 
more likely it is that employers will alter their behavior; in the U.S., with its strong and relatively 
efficient central government, it is to be expected that corporations would take the threat of 
government sanctions (e.g., penalties, imprisonment, etc.) seriously and change their behavior in 
consequence. However, if Coase (1960) is right, then it will also be the case that employers will 
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take free-market actions to recoup any losses brought about through the threat of government 
sanction. These assumptions tie directly into the research questions. If Coase (1960) was right, 
then there should be an observed slowdown in the tempo of H1B hiring after BFCA (the topic of 
research question one), because this action is the most obvious way of preventing H1B 
employers from having to pay the higher, mandated wages for H1B workers. Simply put, if 
companies do not hire H1B workers, then they do not have to worry about paying these workers 
more; presumably, they can design work processes so that existing H1B workers shoulder more 
work, or distribute the work in some other way. If Pigou (2001)[1932] was right, then it should 
be expected that H1B employers in Virginia are paying, and offering to pay, higher wages, 
because this action is the most obvious way of staving off the threat of government sanction as a 
result of BFCA violation.   
 The second theoretical base of the study is the theory of new public management. The 
theory of new public management, which has been enjoying a vogue since the 1980s (Rabin, 
2003), is, according to Moon and DeLeon (2001) a theory that (a) government ought to adopt the 
same efficiency-oriented methods as the private sector and (b) the ultimate duty of government is 
to the individual stakeholder (rather than, for example, corporate interests). BFCA is an example 
of new public management, for two reasons. First, BFCA is a highly efficient program, 
especially in relation to past programs implemented as part of H1B enforcement efforts. Second, 
BFCA is a program whose ultimate purpose is to serve the individual H1B Visa holder (by 
making him or her less likely to be exploited) and also the individual American worker (by 
making him or her less likely to be replaced by an H1B worker who is accepting illegally low 
wages to do the same task that the American H1B worker could).  
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 Thus, new public management is the theory that explains how and why BFCA works, 
while Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theory of regulation explains the philosophical and policy 
orientation behind BFCA. By examining both of these theoretical bases in greater depth, it is 
possible to understand the roots of BFCA, and to match the fruits of the program with its 
intentions and orientations. It is also possible to interweave other theoretical approaches, 
including neoclassical decision theory and agency theory, into the rubric of Pigou’s (2001)[1932] 
and Coase’s (1960) theories, thus broadening the theoretical foundation of the study even further. 
As agency theory is discussed in great depth in chapter two, it should be defined here. Agency 
theory refers to the body of theoretical approaches in which an agent (be it an  individual, a 
corporation, or a government) is held to be an efficacious, want-maximizing actor who is able to 
express wishes and achieve goals (Everling, 1997).  Agency theory is thus distinct from 
deterministic theories in which it is assumed that actions do not emerge from the free will of an 
agent (Everling, 1997). 
Brief Review of the H1B Program 
 There is extensive literature on labor regulation theory, organizational behavior 
modification, and other technical policy topics. These topics will be explored in greater depth in 
chapter two, the literature review. The purpose of this section is to equip the reader with a 
foundational understanding of U.S. work visas and H1B issues through an examination of 
primary literature such as legislation and program descriptions. This basic information will serve 
as a foundation on which the more technical discussion in chapter two can stand. 
The Specialty Occupation Work Visa, more commonly known as H1B,  is a temporary 
working visa granted under  the United States Immigration & Nationality Act, Section 
101(a)(15)(H). By means of this legislation, American employers are allowed to temporarily 
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employ non-American workers who possess a highly specialized knowledge in a field of human 
such as engineering, physical sciences, social sciences, medicine, business specialties, theology, 
and the arts. For the vast majority of applicants, the visa requires a Bachelor’s degree or its 
equivalent as a minimum application requirement. Before 1991, H1B visas were not subject to 
any annual numerical cap, but after this date caps have been in place and their numbers have 
fluctuated over time. Beginning in 1991, Congress capped the number of work visas available 
each year at 65,000. After that cap was hit in both 1997 and 1998, Congress temporarily raised 
the cap on H1B visas from 65,000 to 115,000 in both 1999 and 2000, and then to 195,000 for 
fiscal years 2001-2003. However, in 2004, Congress revised the cap downward to its initial 
allotment of 65,000 (USCIS, 2011). 
According to immigration laws and U.S. Department of Labor regulations, all employers 
are required to submit a Labor Condition Application (LCA) for every foreign worker they 
intend to hire under an H1B visa. The initial application must be filed with the State Department 
of Labor (DOL) but the final approval or denial must be made by the U.S. Department of 
Labor’s National Processing Center in Atlanta, Georgia.  Employers are required to file the LCA 
sixty day prior to the date on which they intend to employ a foreign worker. The State DOL and 
U.S. DOL are required to make a decision no later than sixty days from the filing date. 
The 1990 Immigration Act addressed two major desiderata of LCAs: (a) The wages of 
Americans not be affected by the hiring of foreign workers under the H1B specialty occupation 
visa category and (b) foreign workers be protected against exploitation by U.S. employers. The 
law requires that employers demonstrate to the U.S. DOL the conditions under which the foreign 
workers will be hired  and employed. The following are the requirements as stated by the  U.S. 
Department of Labor: (a) The employer promises to pay an equal or greater wage to a foreign 
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worker compared to other American employees in the same position; (b) the employment of a 
foreign worker will not adversely affect the employment of American workers; (c) the foreign 
worker for whom specialty occupation status is requested will be given a copy of the LCA, and 
the employer must notify the foreign worker or his/her representative if the job is unionized, or if 
not, that it has posted notice of the LCA filing in a publicly accessible place, such as local 
newspaper; (d) if the employer has over 50 employees, the number of foreign workers under the 
specialty occupation category cannot exceed 15% of the workforce; (e) if the employer has 26-50 
employees, the number of the foreign workers cannot exceed 12 employees; and (f) if the 
employer has 25 or fewer employees, the number of foreign workers cannot exceed 7 employees. 
Exempt from the above requirements are foreign workers who are paid at least $60,000 annually 
or who have an advanced degree in a science or medical field. The employer must swear under 
oath that it has not and will not “displace” a U.S. worker during the period from 90 days before 
the H1B petition is filed until 90 days after it has been filed. 
 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) tailored and implemented the 
Benefit Fraud Assessment (BFCA) Program in 2006 to enforce regulations designed for various 
non-immigrants, including the H1B visa. The BFCA includes internal reviews and audits by the 
USCIS Immigration Officers to validate the accuracy of petitions and applications submitted by 
employers on behalf of foreign workers under the H1B visa, including the location of the 
employment and worker qualifications. The program conducts site visits to confirm the company 
address and work location, interview HR personnel who are familiar with the petition, and 
confirm details pertaining to work location, job requirement, wage rate, and prevailing wage. 
The stated goals of the BFCA’s site visit are to confirm: (a) The existence of the petitioning 
employer, (b) the relationship between the petitioner and the beneficiary, (c) the beneficiary’s 
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employment in the capacity specified and at the location(s) specified, (d) the beneficiary’s 
experience and/or qualifications; and (e) the existence or non-existence of multiple or duplicate 
filings by the same petitioner. 
 There are three important underlying themes that occur in much of the discussion of the 
H1B program. These themes are helpful ways in which to approach the program, for two 
reasons. First, a theme is also close to a theory, and approaching even a basic discussion of H1B 
from a theoretical framework is a way of bringing more rigor to the discussion than listing 
decontextualized facts and figures about the program. Second, some of these themes or theories 
recur in later sections of the literature review; for example, the economic logic that underlies 
labor migration theories as they pertain to the H1B program also underlies theories of cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) that apply to business decision-making in the face of labor regulation. 
With this explanation in mind, the three themes that will be explored in this section are: (a) 
Demographic change, (b) the economics of labor migration, and (c) the sociology and politics of 
labor migration. These topics are not only backgrounders on H1B itself but also brief 
introductions to some more complex theoretical topics evaluated in the literature review.   
H1B and Demographic Change 
 It can be argued that the United States of America is in the process of permanent and 
designed demographic change. In other words, the demographics of the United States change 
almost as a matter of habit, and because of strong policy influences in the federal government 
(specifically, through the legislative and judicial arms).  
 The United States is by definition a nation of immigrants. The scale of American 
immigration—particularly immigration for economic reasons—is vast. The modern era of 
immigration in the United States can be said to have begun in 1870. Starting in that year, and 
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ending in 1913, no less than 15.8 million foreigners settled in the United States. This influx of 
migrants displays an almost linear relationship with the increase in the American workforce, 
which went from 14.7 million in 1870 to 38.3 million in 1913 (Green, 2009). Immigration on 
such a massive scale was enabled by government policies that made migration easier. The 
purpose of such policies was largely economic. Depleted after the bloody Civil War, the United 
States stood in need of new labor and, perhaps, new hope and energy that were more easily 
provided by those for whom America was still a promised land.  
 Within years, the demographic shift in the labor force of the United States, as enabled by 
immigration, resulted in a period of sustained economic growth. The H1B program can be seen 
as an extension of the same impulse that led the U.S. to open its borders in 1870. This time, the 
shortage of workers is not agricultural and industrial, but rather service- and knowledge-based. 
The H1B program thus serves the function of temporarily changing the demographics of the 
American workforce so as to remedy shortfalls in the existing skill-sets of American workers. 
This impulse, while it might seem new, is based in policies that are over 140 years old, and that 
have sought to opportunistically transform American demographics to the country’s economic 
advantage.  Of course, government policies are only the supply side of the equation; they render 
labor immigration possible, but they do not dictate the terms of demand. Thus, it is also 
necessary to examine the H1B program as part of the increasingly globalized demand for many 
jobs. 
H1B and Labor Migration 
 Ravenstein (1885) is credited with the first systematic and scientific attempt to explain 
the phenomenon of international labor migration. Ravenstein (1885) advanced a theory driven by 
notions of deficit and opportunity. The immigrant worker leaves his or her country when that 
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country does not offer forms of economic, social, and political reward that are as meaningful as 
what the worker anticipates in the destination country. Simply put, then, the labor migrant is in 
search of a better life, with the key difference between such migrants and others (for example, 
religiously-motivated migrants) being that their notion of a good life is grounded in economic 
opportunity. 
 Labor migration is actually quite a complex phenomenon, for a number of reasons. First, 
labor migration is based partly on perceptions, which can be difficult to measure or to model into 
formal economic theories. Many people in the indigenous workforce of a country do not choose 
to migrate, or even to try to migrate to; others do, and it remains unknown whether the difference 
between these two populations can be ascribed to factors such as education, aspiration, perceived 
economic opportunity, perceived ease of migration, personal psychological factors, and other 
variables.  
 However, at the macro level, labor migration becomes simpler to predict and more simple 
to understand. If workers can make more money for the same task by switching geographies, 
they will do so; many bedrock theories of neoclassical economies, borne out by empirical 
studies, show that increasing wages is a powerful stimulant of changed economic behavior (such 
as working harder, learning a new trader, going to another country, etc.). Thus, even if we cannot 
always predict or understand what makes individual workers migrate, theories such as the 
Efficiency Wage Theorem (Osterman, 1994) help to explain the phenomenon of labor migration 
on the macro scale.   
 The H1B is an incentive for the labor migration of people who have marketable skills in 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). These people have added incentives to 
participate in labor migration. To begin with, their skills are mental skills; they do not, for the 
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most part, require extensive capital assets to demonstrate. A software coder carries his or her 
knowledge in the brain, and can work just as easily behind a computer screen in Manhattan 
versus Mumbai. 
Social and Political Aspects of the H1B Program   
      The H1B program is a common target for social and political critique as well as support. 
Supporters of the H1B program point to its rootedness in the principles of global supply and 
demand, and argue that the importation of foreign workers is more beneficial, and less harmful, 
than subsidizing Americans who would do the same jobs for greater pay, or who do not exist in 
sufficient numbers to staff H1B jobs. These supporters rely upon a neoclassical (indeed, 
libertarian) vision of market efficiency in which reducing artificial constraints on a market 
always improves the net utility for all players, even if it is in ways that cannot be detected. As the 
discussion of Coase (1960) and libertarian theorists later in the literature review will illustrate, 
there is a large body of work that defends the idea of non-interference in labor markets, even if 
such non-interference seems to hurt the interests of one’s own compatriots.  
 Another body of social and political responses to the H1B program are rooted in a much 
older tradition of economic analysis, championed by Aristotle and Aquinas, in which the purpose 
of economic activity is not enrichment for its own sake, but rather the building of a good life for 
specific communities. To these social and political traditionalists, economics is a local 
instrument, and the global market is an abstraction; what matters to them, therefore, is not the 
efficient functioning of a market, but what they see as an ethical functioning of a market. Pigou 
(2001)[1932] can be identified with this view, in opposition to Coase (1960).  
 Thus, what observers believe about the social and political ramifications of the H1B 
program is rooted in some form of economic philosophy, whether they know it or not. 
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Opponents who believe that the H1B program hurts American workers are following the lead of 
Pigou (2001)[1932] and other thinkers to whom economics ought to be a slave of communal 
interests; supporters of the H1B are following the lead of Coase (1960) and other theorists of 
market efficiency. These points will be made at greater length later in the literature review.     
Structure of the Study 
 The first chapter of this study is the introduction. The second chapter comprises the 
literature review. The third chapter will be the discussion of methodology. The fourth chapter 
will be the presentation and discussion of results. The fifth chapter will be the conclusion, with 
references and appendices to follow. Each chapter will be prefaced by a brief introduction listing 
and briefly explaining the sub-sections within that chapter. 
Conclusion and Transition 
 The H1B Visa program has long been regarded as a policy compromise that allows 
American technology companies to benefit from access to a global workforce willing to work 
and live temporarily in the United States without depriving American technology workers of an 
excessive number of jobs (Green, 2009). In this sense, the H1B Visa program is supposed to 
address the innovation and workforce needs of the entire American economy while also 
maintaining a strong emphasis on the development of American labor opportunities. However 
well-intention, the H1B Visa program cannot work if it does not achieve its intended goals. If 
employers can flout the H1B regulations and hire larger numbers of H1B Visa holders, or pay 
these workers less, then individual employers might prosper, but the larger economy falters. This 
introductory chapter of the study has introduced some of the dimensions of this argument, 
explained how to test for the efficacy of BFCA for the state of Virginia and for the time horizon 
in the sample, and discussed some of the underlying history and theory of H1B enforcement. The 
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next chapter will discuss, analyze, and synthesize the literature on labor policy, the H1B Visa 
program, and labor and employer incentives in a more detailed fashion.   
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Overview of the Literature Review 
 Any study of the H1B Visa program, and of governmental attempts to enforce aspects of 
the program, touches upon several theories and distinct topic areas. To begin with, the topic of 
government intervention in labor policy must be understood through a framework of both 
economics and politics. Some of the key questions in this area are: Why do governments take a 
role in labor law and its enforcement? What goals are governments trying to promote by taking 
this role? What are the theoretical justifications for pro- versus anti-regulatory arguments? After 
laying down this theoretical framework, it is possible to look at the history of labor regulation in 
the United States, and to relate this history to immigrants and immigrant labor in particular. With 
both the history and the theory addressed, it then becomes possible to focus more closely on the 
role of the actual institutions that administer H1B and explain their roles, motivations, histories, 
and constraints. Finally, with all of this ground covered, it is possible to discuss the literature 
pertaining to H1B enforcement. Thus, this literature review will follow a reverse pyramid 
structure, starting with a broader base of theories of governance and moving to a pinnacle of 
empirical detail about H1B enforcement.  
 The Benefit Fraud Assessment (BFCA) Program is an example of governmental policy. 
More specifically, BFCA is a kind of regulation about what employers can and cannot do. 
Therefore, an appropriate means of beginning the discussion of theory in this section is to 
explain how, at the very high level, regulation is theorized, and then to use theory to illuminate 
the question of how governments, companies, and workers (particularly foreign workers) interact 
with each other. However abstract it might seem, such theory is intimately connected to United 
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) action, and forms an indispensable 
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backdrop against which to make sense of government, company, and worker action. USCIS is 
the government body through which BFCA compliance is assessed, so understanding its working 
is relevant to the study.  
 There are numerous means of examining governance and regulation. One simple means 
of making sense of this complex topic is though the rival regulatory theories of Arthur Pigou 
(2001)[1932] and Ronald Coase (1960). These two economists proved to be among the 20
th
 
century’s most influential defenders of two distinct approaches to regulation: The laissez-faire 
market approach as championed by Coase (1960), and the hybrid market approach championed 
by Pigou. To be sure, these approaches are not the only theories about labor regulation, but they 
are the only approaches with mainstream adherence in the history of American labor policy. In 
other words, over the course of more than two centuries, American labor policy can be seen to 
alternate between the laissez faire approach described by Coase (1960) and the hybrid market 
approach of Pigou (2001)[1932]; there is no tradition, for example, of socialist theories applied 
to labor regulation. Accordingly, even though Coase (1960) and Pigou (1960) represent theories 
that are not necessarily far from each other on the ideological spectrum, these theories are still 
ideal descriptors of the American experience and warrant a closer look on that count alone. 
 The work of Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) can be complex, and requires a fairly 
detailed exposition before it can be applied to actual labor regulation data. Thus, this section will 
begin with a general introduction to the thought of Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960). How 
these theories have actually been applied in the American labor market will be discussed at 
greater length in other sections of the literature review.  It should be noted at the outset of this 
discussion that, if Coase (1960) was right, then there ought to be be an observed decline in the 
tempo of H1B hiring after BFCA (as represented in research question one), because this action is 
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the most obvious way of preventing H1B employers from having to pay the higher, mandated 
wages for H1B workers. Thus, if companies do not hire H1B workers, they do not have to be 
concerned about higher per-worker wages; perhaps they might design work processes so that 
existing H1B workers shoulder more work, or redistribute the work in some other fashion. If 
Pigou (2001)[1932] was right, it should be expected that H1B employers in Virginia are paying, 
and are offering to pay, higher wages, because this action is the most obvious way of mitigating 
the threat of government sanction as a result of BFCA violation. 
 It should also be noted that there is a direct connection between the theoretical lens of 
New Public Management as discussed by Berland and Dreveton (2006) and the theories  of 
Coase (1960) and Pigou (2001)[1932]. The connection is simple: Because New Public 
Management is efficient and results-oriented, it renders government more able to detect and mete 
out sanctions to violators of law; thus, New Public Management is the framework that allows 
governments to enact genuinely Pigouvian policy. As Berland and Dreveton (2006) pointed out, 
many governments have similar laws, but the level of compliance with these laws varies 
drastically from country to country; one of the reasons for this variance is that, in some countries, 
government management is so inefficient or even corrupt that corporate lawbreakers need not 
fear sanction from the government.    
 Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) presented theories that are used to structure 
government response to both corporations and individuals. However, both theories also contain 
the germ of agency theory, which is a more generic theory of human action. Both Pigou 
(2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) apply agency theory to government; in other words, they offer 
theories about why governments (at least democratic governments) act in the way that they do, 
what the constraints on action are, and what ethical action would look like. The reason that 
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agency theory is of crucial importance is that, in any study of labor regulation, it is necessary to 
be able to model (a) how parties interact with each other, (b) why they interact with each other in 
the ways that they do, (c) where the limits of free action lie, and (d) how the interactions could 
change if subject to a different set of rules.  Pigou (1960) and Coase (2001) have specific, but 
short, answers to these questions; moreover, because of these theorists’ focus on government, 
they cast little light on how agency theory applies to individuals (such as workers) and corporate 
bodies (such as companies and unions). Thus, having understood Coase (1960) and Pigou’s 
(2001)[1932] theories, it is necessary to widen the field of inquiry and survey general forms of 
agency theory.  
 To be sure, such a discussion carries the possibility of digression, because every major 
policy thinker from Plato to Keynes employs some form of agency theory, and agency theory is 
deeply embedded in all theories of economics, political action, and labor policy. It is therefore 
necessary to discuss agency theory in as focused a way as possible, which can be done in two 
ways: (a) Keeping the focus on forms of agency theory that presume relative freedom of interest 
articulation, as is (more or less) the case in liberal democracies and (b) relating agency theory 
back to Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theme of change through coercion and Coase’s (1960) theme of 
change through rational cost-benefit analysis.   
 After the discussion of the theories of Pigou (2001)[1932], Coase (1960), and agency 
theory will follow a review of American labor history, starting in the late 19
th
 century. It might 
seem as if this time period is too early to be relevant to the current study. However, many issues 
brought up in the context of contemporary immigration policy and regulation have their origin in 
the late 19
th
 century, which was when foreign labor began to play a profoundly important role in 
almost all sectors of the American economy, and when government, corporations, and workers 
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first began to engage each other in the process of interest articulation and compromise that gave 
rise to modern American labor laws and enforcement policies. Thus, historically speaking, the 
late 19
th
 century offers an ideal context in which to understand the foreign labor regulation issues 
of the 20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries, and even suggests some lessons that can be applied to today’s 
problems. 
 After discussing the paradigm shift in labor law and regulation that took place in the 19
th
 
century, the literature review will move forward to a consideration of foreign labor in 
contemporary America. The frame of reference for this discussion will not be historical, but 
legal. A number of seminal court cases will be examined for their ability to cast light on the 
dynamics of contemporary foreign labor regulation. The law is useful ground on which to 
understand how theories and histories of labor regulation are construed; in other words, 
overviews of key court cases can be used to understand how (or  whether) government actually 
applies the theories of Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) to real-life labor scenarios, and to 
measure changes between historical and current attitudes.  
 The next component of the literature review will be a discussion of USCIS. There will be 
two components to this discussion. The first component will be an overview of the USCIS itself, 
with particular attention paid to the institution’s history vis-à-vis foreign workers and to more 
recent bureaucratic developments that have influenced the character of USCIS. The second 
component will be a relation of USCIS to the framework of New Public Management (NPM), 
accompanied by an argument that the shift from the old to the new USCIS, in terms of foreign 
worker policy, can be understood through the lens of NPM. Finally, the chapter will conclude 
with a summary of the theories and literature consulted in the earlier sections. 
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Arthur Pigou and Ronald Coase 
 It might seem as if this theoretical debate between two dead British economists has little 
to do with matters of American labor policy today. In point of fact, however, the ideas put 
forward by both Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) are at the conceptual center of American 
labor law, policy, and enforcement debate. Today, the positions associated with Coase (1960) are 
articulated by American libertarians, classical liberals, and neoconservatives, while Pigou’s 
(2001)[1932] positions are held largely by Democrats. Siding with a particular theorist has 
extremely important implications for labor policy. A Pigouvian would argue that no fair 
agreement can be reached between U.S. employers and foreign workers because of (a) the strong 
self-interest on both sides and (b) the lack of a natural meeting-ground between the two parties’ 
body of interests. Thus, a Pigouvian would suggest a policy in which the full apparatus of 
government surveillance, punishment (for example, through fines and punishment), and other 
forms of incentivization be used to regulate the market consisting of U.S. employers and foreign 
workers.  
 On the other hand, a Coasean would suggest that government do as little as possible and 
remove itself from between U.S. employers and foreign workers. To the Coasean, government’s 
role in regulating free contracts between workers and employers would be inefficient and 
unnatural, and would merely prevent market forces from reaching a cooperative consensus of the 
kind so valued in game theory. In other words, even if government regulations succeeded in 
changing the nature of relationships between the actors, all parties would pay a high cost for this 
unnatural state of affairs. With these differences in mind, it is worth examining Coase’s (1960) 
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and Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theoretical frameworks more closely, while also applying these 
frameworks to empirical aspects of American labor policy over the years. 
 
 The difference between Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) can be understood as the 
difference between what Lukes (1974, p. 34) called the first and the second dimensions of 
power: 
Table 1  
The Three Dimensions of Power 
Dimension Description 
 
Liberal 
 
...the liberal takes men as they are and applies want-regarding principles 
to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to 
their policy preference as manifested by their political participation. 
 
Reformist The reformist, seeing and deploring that not all men’s wants are given 
equal weight by the political system, also relates their interests to what 
they want or prefer, but allows that this may be revealed in more indirect 
and sub-political ways—in the form of deflected, submerged, or concealed 
wants and preferences. 
 
Radical The radical...maintains that men’s wants may themselves be a product of a 
system which works against their interests, and in such cases, relates the 
latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the 
choice.  
 
 
This difference will become apparent after examining the specifics of both Pigou’s reformist and 
Coase’s liberal theories, and also can be used as a way to relate the work of these two thinkers to 
regulatory theory in general. Simply put, Pigou advocates a reformist or radical approach to the 
use of power, whereas Coase advocates a liberal approach. Thus, the distinction between the 
prescriptions made by these thinkers—Pigou’s emphasis on punishing and intimidating 
businesses to enforce compliance and Coase’s emphasis on allowing businesses to articulate and 
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execute their own interests without government interference—are thus rooted in these two 
thinkers’ basic commitments to different philosophies of power.       
 Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) offer the two leading modern prescriptive 
approaches to economic policy. Coase wrote in direct response to Pigou, and is generally 
assumed to have taken an adversarial position to Pigou’s prescriptions. This section of the 
literature review contains a description and critical examination of both lines of thinking, 
contrasting Pigou and Coase where their policy suggestions diverse and comparing them on the 
few occasions that their arguments truly seem to coincide. The conclusion is that, whereas there 
are individual areas of overlap between the two fields of economic policy, their theories diverge 
and stand in stark contrast to each other. 
 The dominating influence over Pigou (2001)[1932] is generally taken to be Pigou’s 
mentor, Afred Marshall. However, an earlier and greater influence looms over some of Pigou’s 
policy prescriptions. For example, when Pigou stated that economics was a handmaid to ethics, 
he was clearly following the Aristotelian line of thinking as laid out in the Politics. It is worth 
quoting Aristotle (2004) at length if only to demonstrate Pigou’s later indebtedness to him: 
It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and 
the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent 
disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a 
thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and 
not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not 
the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess...  (p. 56). 
This passage contains the seed of the policy debate worked out in much more detail and 
sophistication between Pigou and Coase. In it Aristotle attempted to reconcile the two 
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enduring poles of economic practice and policy in the Western tradition: The purity of 
property rights and enterprise on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the urge to 
regulate economic life for the good of all.  
In modern terms, the Aristotelian (2004) mean for economic policy, later championed by 
Pigou (2001)[1932], is the point at which natural love of self creates external costs. It should be 
noted that an externality is either a cost or a benefit that is borne (or enjoyed) by a third party to a 
transaction (Krugman & Wells, 2009). Beneficial externalities are known as positive 
externalities while harmful externalities are known as negative externalities. There are many 
ways in which the concepts of negative and positive externalities apply to questions of 
technological change and also to the link between technological change and economic growth. 
Consider the case of a private firm that opens up a technology education school to spread 
knowledge of technology far and wide among the citizenry. Such a firm would create positive 
externalities for others. For example, graduates of this firm’s school could go on to create forms 
of technology that improved the lives of ordinary people who had nothing to do with the school. 
Now consider the case of a technology firm in America that employs only Indian H1B Visa 
workers. Such a firm could be said to create negative externalities by making ordinary 
Americans suffer in a marketplace in which there are fewer jobs for them, and to create positive 
externalities by powering economic growth that would trickle down, in some form, to American 
workers.    
 In Aristotle’s (2004) pre-industrial time, however, the concept of externalities was 
immature, as producers were unable to generate either benefits or costs on scales substantial 
enough to necessitate fine policy debates about, and distinctions pertaining to, externalities. 
Pigou (2001)[1932], meanwhile, inherited a century of economic policy discourse in the wake of 
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the Industrial Revolution. For Pigou, as well as for the coming generation of Keynesian and post-
Keynesian economists, the question of private profit versus public good (or cost) was of the 
utmost importance in an era that had seen pollution, urbanization, and even a world war result 
from economic policies originating in the private sphere (Krugman & Wells, 2009). Pigou’s 
conscience was so deeply troubled by the negative social effects of economic policy that, in 
presenting a paper on the topic of the reorganization of industry for a wartime economy, he 
began by making the following extraordinary speech:  
...the economic wreckage now going forward, immense and unprecedented 
though it be, is to my mind trivial and insignificant in comparison with the human 
and moral wreckage…it is not right that we should come to debate our lesser 
economic problems without a memory and a word for their terrible setting of 
blood (p. 32). 
For Pigou, then, economic policy was forever conditioned by his own experience of war, which 
he detested not only as a participant but also as a witness to the destruction of the flower of his 
generation, and the beginning of England’s three-decade slide into economic and political 
insignificance. Without understanding these pivotal facts about Pigou and his time, it is 
impossible to do justice to Pigouvian ideas about economics; Pigou himself made his first major 
statement about economic policy with these prefatory comments about the horror and 
wastefulness of conflict, and his experience ought to be respected. 
Pigou’s (2001)[1932]paradigm-forming statement on economic policy came in the form 
of his The Economics of Welfare. Pigou himself stated that “The major part of this volume...is 
concerned, not with war, but with peace” (p. 6)  Like Aristotle (2004), Pigou was specifically 
concerned with how benevolence (i.e. peacefulness) can emerge from economic arrangements, 
   
30 
and it is clear that this concern of his arises from his personal and professional desire to curtail 
the irrationality of conflict. 
Pigou (2001)[1932] imagined a very specific intersection between economic policies and 
peace. To begin with, Pigou envisioned a distinct role for the state, which, importantly, he treated 
as distinct from the body of voters and the apparatus of government. For example, Pigou argued 
that “the State should protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects of our 
irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over our descendants” (p. 17). 
Two themes latent in this claim lay the foundation for Pigou’s (2001)[1932] philosophy 
of economic policy. The first claim is that the state, which Pigou treats as synonymous with 
government, is both an abstract entity and a trustee with equal responsibilities to all of its 
stakeholders, even the unborn; and the second claim is that a subset of economic activity can be 
described as irrational to an extent that has to be deliberately rationalized by the state’s 
intervention Accordingly, Pigouvian economic policy emerges as a kind of collective enterprise, 
one whose goal is not only to check external costs but also to maximize external benefits by 
getting businesses to form co-operative pools in which “the profits of each member severally 
depend on the efficiency of all collectively” (p. 341). Pigou envisioned the state as the entity that 
can check costs by means of taxes and promote benefits by subsidy.  
Again, Pigou (2001)[1932] emphasized the close link between economic policy and 
social policy when he stated his presumption that “qualitative conclusions about the effect of an 
economic cause upon economic welfare will hold good also on the effect on total welfare” (p. 
20).  What happens in the economic sphere impacts the social sphere, as Pigou had believed all 
his professional life. He even connected this conclusion back to his ideas about conflict, noting 
that the German agricultural economy “enabled her to resist the British blockade in the Great 
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War for a much longer period than would otherwise have been possible” (p. 19).  The possibility 
of conflict—and the ability of economics to provide either a rational and productive alternative, 
or else outright support to belligerents—was never far from Pigou’s theory, even at its most 
abstruse. Consequently, Pigou’s economic policy is intertwined with social policy in general and 
issues of conflict and irrationality in particular. 
In terms of specific prescriptions, Pigou’s (2001)[1932] work suggested particular means 
by which government can go about the business of regulation. Aslanbeigui and Medema (1998) 
surveyed Pigou’s work and discussed his awareness of the likelihood that government regulation 
would result in resource reallocation. Pigou, like Coase (1960), believed that such government-
driven reallocation could often be wasteful, but, as a hedge, recommended that government 
weigh the costs and benefits of such reallocation upon each instance of proposed regulation. As 
such, Pigou exhorts the government to act with a sensitivity towards the current state of the 
market even as he sounds thematic notes that suggest an affinity to conservationism and 
socialism.  
Ronald Coase (1960) had a different trajectory, personally and professionally, than Pigou 
(2001)[1932], and this difference also forms the basis of the contrast between the economic 
policy recommendations of the two men. Firstly, Coase had no direct experience of war; while 
Pigou had driven an ambulance in the First World War, Coase worked in a statistics office in the 
Second World War, and, unlike Pigou, never mentioned either the horror or the irrationality of 
war in any of his professional work. There is no indication that Coase was as personally bothered 
by conflict as Pigou; indeed, in his groundbreaking 1960 article that attacked Pigouvian ideas 
about externalities, Coase chose cooperation as the prism through which to view economic 
policy. 
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Coase’s (1960) article, “The Problem of Social Cost,” revolved around an example 
intended to demonstrate the primacy of cooperation in any rational framing of economic policy. 
Coase discussed the case of a cattle-breeder’s livestock wandering on to the nearby land of a 
farmer, where the herds of cattle destroy the crops. Coase argued that, while such a scenario 
would on any Pigouvian economic policy elicit fines and/or taxes for the cattle-breeder, a more 
efficient (and therefore rational) approach would be to recognize the reciprocal relationship 
between the two parties; and to allow them to come to a market-based resolution to the problem, 
with government involvement limited to the drafting and oversight of laws intended to smooth 
such a transaction. 
Both of these economic policy prescriptions were undeniably revolutionary. Coase 
(1960) urged reciprocal empathy for the cattle-breeder in his example, arguing that the breeder’s 
lack of access to the farmer’s land to fatten the cattle constituted a loss as economically tangible 
(albeit not as morally compelling) as the farmer’s loss of the crops. Meanwhile, in a Pigouvian 
scheme, the farmer would be recognized as the sole victim in the transaction, and would be 
compensated and/or protected accordingly. Coase revealed an implicit and instinctive trust in the 
marketplace that Pigou (2001)[1932] lacked; to revert to the intellectual terminology of the First 
World War, Pigou had seen unchecked market activity as the god that failed, that in some way 
generated the masses of dead people and wrecked ideals that so moved him. Coase’s attitude was 
far more optimistic, buoyed perhaps by the rising English GDP in his time (by contrast, GDP 
was flat from 1925 to 1935, the period of Pigou’s greatest professional activity) and perhaps by a 
more optimistic disposition than Pigou’s As a result, Coase demonstrated a fine-tuned and 
unrelenting belief in markets, rationality, and cooperation that was missing from Pigou, and that 
formed the basis of Coase’s subsequent economic policy prescriptions. 
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Examining Coase’s (1960) article more closely discloses the foundations of an economic 
policy suited to the paradigm of co-operation. At the very highest level, Coase operated on the 
laissez faire paradigm; there is no trace in him of Pigou’s (2001)[1932] self-avowed socialist 
tendencies, even though all of Pigou’s market-friendly tendencies resurfaced in Coase. 
For example, Coase (1060) argued that “Satisfactory views on policy can only come from 
a patient study of how, in practice, the market, firms, and governments handle the problem of 
harmful effects” (p. 10). At first blush, this statement indicated that Coase was not in favor of a 
positive economic policy, at least insofar as policy is an activity that is framed by government, 
but rather desired a policy of governmental absence from transactions. Indeed, wrote Coase, “It 
is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the 
advantages, which come from governmental regulation” (p. 10). 
Coase (1960) offered a fairly compelling example of his proposed policy-of-absence in 
action, by discussing the liability of British train operators (in the private era as well as in the era 
of nationalization). Apparently, in Britain, there was a law still current at Coase’s time of writing 
stating that non-negligent use of steam engines in trains could not be penalized when it caused 
sparks and therefore led to woods and other property burning down. Coase discussed this 
scenario in light of both his and Pigou’s theories of economic policy. Pigou, who settled upon 
this example himself, would have imposed some penalty on the train operators in order to 
compensate the owners of the woods for their losses. Coase took a completely different 
approach—one in which he did not altogether rule out the role of government as a framer of 
economic policy, but in which he subordinated the role of the government to the role of the 
market. 
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Imagine, Coase (1060) wrote, that “running one train per day would enable the railway to 
perform services worth $150 per annum and running two trains a day would enable the railway 
to perform services worth $250 per annum” (p. 15).  Now imagine that the cost of running one 
train a day is $60 in crop destruction, and the cost of running two trains a day is $120 in crop 
destruction; meanwhile the cost of running the train itself is $50 per annum for one train and 
$100 per annum for two trains. From this assumption, Coase entered into a discussion of a 
plausible scenario in which making the railroad company liable for fires would make it 
unprofitable to run any trains at all, and in which the growing of crops would not make up for the 
loss in economic services. Now, as Coase diligently pointed out, there are many underlying 
assumptions that could cause one to argue that it would result in more net economic activity to 
keep the train from running at all, but his point is merely to present a plausible scenario in which 
it is better to have the train run with no liability, because the economic activity generated by the 
train outweighs the value of the lost crops. 
If one seized upon the crop and railroad example to generate a theory of Pigouvian-style 
economic policy, it would no doubt be quite complex, as one would have to calculate the  
relative costs of running the trains without liability versus the relative costs of running (or not 
running) the trains in deference to the crop damage, and assign taxes, penalties, and/or subsidies 
accordingly. However, in Coase’s (1960) more easy-going economic policy, government allows 
the players themselves to work the matter out, with the regulatory apparatus standing by to make 
sure that old laws are not violated rather than taking an activist role and creating new laws. The 
government becomes, to the extent possible, a referee rather than a participant in the framing of 
economic policy. 
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 In making this claim, Coase (1960) was building on the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart 
(1961), which, in a similar way, passed the buck of policy responsibility away from policy-
makers and to society at large. In this approach to both legal and economic philosophy, officials 
are not so much framers of policy as they are respecters of it. On this view, policy is something 
that gets worked out despite, and away from, the attempts of government, and wise governments 
simply rubber-stamp custom. It is worth quoting Hart’s (1961) description of his rule of 
recognition, which is the legal equivalent of Coase’s wait-and-see approach to economic policy-
making, to flesh out the conceptual origins of policy noninterventionism: 
…the rule of recognition of a legal system is like the scoring rule of a game. In 
the course of the game the general rule defining the activities which constitute 
scoring (runs, goals, etc.) is seldom formulated; instead it is used by officials and 
players in identifying the particular phases which count toward winning (Hart, 
1961, pp. 98-99).. 
One limitation characterizing both Hart’s (1961) and Coase’s (1960) philosophies of 
policy is that they engage in a kind of dead-end positivism. In Coase’s case, this upshot is 
particularly ironic, as his theory of economic policy is actually an attempt to evade what 
he considers the numerous and cumbersome rules laid down by a Pigouvian system. But 
consider that Coase’s entire system of economic policy hinges on accurately estimating 
what he confesses cannot be accurately estimated. Returning to the train example, Coase 
conceded that: 
It is enough for my purpose to show that, from an economic point of view, a 
situation in which there is ‘uncompensated damage done to surrounding woods by 
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sparks from railway engines’ is not necessarily undesirable. Whether it is 
desirable or not depends on the particular circumstances (Coase, 1960, p. 17). 
While this final line sounds parenthetical, it is in fact key to Coase’s (1960) position on 
economic policy, for it is in the determination of these particular circumstances that the 
entire policy challenge lies. Coase admitted that determining the overall cost to the 
economy of a train not running versus some crops burning down as a result of a train 
running is not merely very difficult; it is subjective, because different actors may bring in 
different assumptions, between which an objective party may not be able to adjudicate. 
What if the farmer argues that the total value of crop loss is much higher than it appears 
because the land will be rendered arid for several years? What if the railway demonstrates 
that the running of a particular train has some kind of Keynesian Multiplier effect on the 
economy? The rival parties can, and will, lobby to amplify their own interests, and 
minimize those of the opponent, to any third party that cares to listen. In such a situation, 
the only role of a government authority is to do nothing at all, or to make a necessarily 
arbitrary decision about which party is more in the right than the other. 
 If government does nothing at all, or even very little, about disputes of this kind, leaving 
them largely up to the disputing parties (i.e., the market) to settle, such inaction sets a disturbing 
precedent. It sends the message that the behavior of the market determines what is right, at least 
in the economic realm; and, if one is to believe Pigou (2001)[1932], economic policy is 
connected to the welfare of the entire polity. The problem with allowing the habitual behavior of 
the marketplace to confer legitimacy on economic actions and transactions was pointed out in 
another context by Hart (1961) himself, when he wrote that “because habits are not ‘normative’, 
they cannot confer rights or authority on anyone” (p. 58). 
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 This argument exposed a possible flaw in the economic policy thinking of Coase (1960), 
who, at least in his 1960 paper, assumed that the purpose of the state is, at best, to maximize 
economic activity by refusing to engage in allegedly inefficient taxation practices, and by 
refusing to assign liability to economic events that are profitable. But the purpose of the state, 
and the purpose of the law upheld and represented by the state, is also to confer rights and 
authority on people, in such a manner as to not only settle current transactions but also to send a 
message to future agents. In a way, this contention recalls Pigou’s (2001)[1932] argument that 
government ought to be the caretaker of the interests of generations yet to come. The state acts 
not only for present agents but also to establish precedents and prepare the way for future agents 
to understand their rights, roles, and responsibilities. To abdicate decision-making to the market 
may indeed be inefficient, if considered purely on the basis of a cost-benefit snapshot of a 
particular economic situation; however, the cost of being efficient and allowing such transactions 
to take place on Coase’s wait-and-see basis is that other businesses and other citizens receive the 
message that, for lack of a better phrase, everything goes. While Coase, who immigrated to the 
United States in 1951, was writing at a time of relatively responsible capitalism, the post-1980 
cycle of government deregulation in Coase’s adopted country has demonstrated some of the 
potential outcomes of government and legal policy-makers abdicating decisions to markets. 
Clearly, as the global recession of 2008 demonstrated, markets have no stranglehold on 
efficiency or rationality. For example, in the U.S., retail banks were so thoroughly deregulated 
that they could buy investment banks, a serious conflict of interest (Krugman & Wells, 2009). 
 To this charge, Coase (1960) might have advanced the counter-argument that market 
bargaining is often, but not always, efficient, and that its propensity to be efficient and head off 
conflict outweighs the risks of breakdown. Coase  might also have argued that, in Pigou’s 
   
38 
(2001)[1932] economic policy, there is simply no evidence that the state will make more rational 
decisions than the market. 
 Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) had radically differing opinions as to who counts 
as a stakeholder in economic life. Pigou had a maximalist approach to stakeholders; while he 
never specified who has the most weight in economic life, he did mention that even the unborn 
are stakeholders, and his sensitive attention to the World War I dead suggests that economies 
may even have a responsibility to the dead (e.g. by engaging in rational behavior that would 
avert all kinds of conflict in the first place). Coase, by contrast, had a minimalist approach to 
counting stakeholders. In the example of the trains and the crops, Coase never paused to consider 
that the community’s inhabitants might also be stakeholders, and that the existence of unburned 
farmland might be an external benefit to these stakeholders—perhaps it makes them happier, and 
therefore more productive, to live in such a bucolic community. As Coase explicitly 
acknowledged that economic choice “should be applicable to other human choices such as those 
that are made in law and politics,” (p. 3) it is all the more perplexing to consider his one-
dimensional exposé of the trains and crops, devoid of legal or political analysis of repercussions 
on stakeholders beyond the property owners. 
 On any theory of economic policy that embraces a broader vision of who counts as a 
stakeholder, there is greater ability for that stakeholder to contribute to the resolution of an 
economic transaction in which they have an interest. For example, if a democratic state is the 
most active player in setting economic policy, whether at the national level or by managing 
individual instances of liability, tax, and subsidy, such a state can be appealed to by its citizen-
stakeholders. In the train/crops example, impacted citizens of the area might appear before the 
government to testify about the degradation of their way of life due to train fires, and the hazards 
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to life and limb faced by themselves and their children. However, no such recourse is possible in 
a Coasean, market-driven economic policy from which government is largely absent, because 
there is no ready mechanism for individuals to exert their will against market forces. Perhaps the 
local residents of fire-stricken areas could boycott the railroad, but such a grassroots policy 
might be both difficult to coordinate and slow to exert a negative pull on the railroad company’s 
profits. The market system is simply not set up for individuals to have a direct stake other that in 
voting with their wallets and, in cases of outright criminal and civil liability, involving the justice 
system. One problem with Coase’s (1960) envisioned economic policy is that it leaves only these 
extraordinary recourses to stakeholders, and all but guarantees that they will be locked out of 
debates that might have important repercussions on their lives. 
 Finally, it is still possible that, in a Coasean economic policy, the market-based working 
out of disputes could lead to a new loss for the mass of citizen-stakeholders. Imagine that the 
train company and the crop owners come to an agreement that the trains can burn as many crops 
as they like, because the crop owners will simply obtain restitution from their insurance 
companies. In such a scenario, the local residents would be exposed to constant danger, 
pollution, and the loss of living standards, while the crop owners and train owners would benefit.  
Should this example be considered unduly implausible, it is worth pointing out that something 
very near it took place in the years between the late 1990s and 2008 in the U.S. mortgage lending 
market, when lenders colluded with insurance companies and investment banks to profit from the 
ignorance of subprime borrowers (Krugman & Wells, 2009). There must surely be many other 
historical examples of business owners arranging transactions that are economically efficient for 
them, but that in some way harm a large body of stakeholders. 
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Connecting Coase and Pigou to Labor Issues 
Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) made radically different predictions about the 
rationality of economic agents, with Coase trusting deeply in the market’s ability to generate 
rationality (even should it not innately exist) in agents, and Pigou fretting that there are large 
numbers of both inefficient and irrational people in industry. Such existential disagreements 
between the economists seem to outweigh their common belief that markets ought to function 
efficiently; Pigou and Coase’s shared commitment to efficiency is not enough to unite them 
conceptually. Some of the issues introduced in this discussion of Coase’s and Pigou’s work 
require careful association with the topic at hand, i.e. the use of government’s regulatory powers 
to intervene between U.S. corporations and foreign employees. To begin with, consider Lukes’s 
(1974, pp. 33-34) dimensions of power in Table 1 above, with its distinctions between liberal 
(giving people what they want), reformist (giving people what they want in ways that manage 
power disparities between people and that recognize other stakeholder), and radical power 
(telling people what is right or good for them).  
Coase (1960) championed a liberal approach to the relationship between employers and 
employees. The idea is that employers and employees can work out their relationship with 
minimal interference from the government; in this scenario, the role of government is essentially 
to put its stamp on what employers and employees decide. Pigou (2001)[1932] championed an 
approach that was more radical. Pigou was less trusting of the idea that labor policies can emerge 
from an open exchange between employers and other stakeholders (including not only 
employees but also ordinary people affected by a corporation’s actions)., and therefore envisions 
government as being able to defend both corporations and workers from their own failures to 
articulate their best interest. For example, a Pigouvian policy would enforce a minimum wage 
   
41 
even if workers themselves agreed to work for nothing, because Pigou’s theory suggests that it is 
(a) possible for people (and companies) to be wrong about their own interests and (b) necessary 
for government to close the gap between what employees (or companies) find to be in their self-
interest and between what actually is in their self-interest.  
Pigou (1960) and Coase (2001) are interesting figures through whom to examine the H1B 
situation in the United States, because BFCA is an example of a Pigouvian policy rooted in the 
otherwise Coasean U.S. economic system. The implications of this conclusion will be discussed 
at greater length in chapter five. For now, having provided a general overview of the thought of 
Pigou and Coase, the next section of the literature review turns to agency theory.  
Connecting Coase and Pigou to New Public Management 
 Berland and Dreveton (2006) argued that management controls have been applied to the 
public sector as a means of turning activities into missions whose success can then be measured. 
The main purpose of Berland and Dreveton’s work is to document how management control 
devices from the private sector have been brought to bear on the public sector, and to derive 
lessons from this adaptation. Berland and Dreveton argued that management control underwent 
some profound shifts in meaning when it began to be adopted in public sector contexts beginning 
in the 1970s. Management controls, which for public organizations had measured performance, 
were adapted to a public sector environment in which accountability was more about legal 
compliance than with performance per se. In terms of Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theory, what 
happened in the development of New Public Management was that government became a more 
efficient detector, and punisher, of law-breaking people and companies. New Public 
Management can thus be seen as indispensable to the existence of Pigouvian institutions, for, 
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without efficiency, there cannot be detection, without detection there cannot be punishment, and 
without punishment there cannot be the kind of organizational change discussed by Pigou.  
   According to Berland and Dreveton (2006), the main emphasis of the New Public 
Management (NPM) is the application of traditional private sector performance measurement 
principles and practices into the public sector. In this way, the history of management controls in 
the public sector can be divided into two eras: (a) The era of sole focus on legal compliance and 
(b) the era of a kind of performance measurement more reminiscent of the private sector’s use of 
this tool. BFCA can be seen as an artifact of New Public Management (NPM) applied to USCIS, 
as BFCA is a performance-oriented metric whose success can be measured by numbers of 
regulation-breakers caught, rises in average H1B salary, and other factors.    
  As Berland and Dreveton (2006) argued, there are many difficulties that prevent a smooth 
translation of management controls from the private sector to the public sector. One difficulty is 
that certain information is missing in public sector contexts, and another is that the budgetary 
processes in the public sector may also be flawed in ways that thwart performance measurement 
efforts. For this reason, much of the history of the New Public Management (NPM) is the history 
of attempts to make the existing private tools and approaches fully relevant to the public sector.  
 Some scholars have argued not that NPM itself is to blame for the failure of some public 
sector initiatives, but that NPM does not in fact exist; that NPM is a myth about how public 
organizations act that dissolves upon closer examination. In this line of thinking, NPM is more 
symbolic than real; while public sector organizations remain fundamentally untransformed, the 
NPM offers some veneer of accountability that is ultimately still elusive. This argument is even 
more insidious than the argument that NPM is badly conceived. If NPM is badly conceived, then 
it can be diagnosed, fixed, and adapted to the needs of public sector organizations. If NPM is a 
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myth, then there is no role for private sector management controls in the public sector. One wing 
of Berland and Dreveton’s (2006) argument was devoted to demonstrating that, in many case 
studies of the public sector, NPM has represented a palpable change, one that measurably altered 
the processes and approaches of implementing agencies. Therefore, whatever other charges are 
leveled at NPM, Berland and Dreveton argued that it ought not to be accused of being a chimera. 
In other words, legitimate management control systems for public sector applications can 
certainly be developed; whether or not they succeed is another matter, and one that is dependent 
on extraneous variables as well as on the application of NPM itself.  
 As Berland and Dreveton (2006) concluded, on the basis of the driver apprehension 
example and other evidence, “Performance in the public sector is very ambiguous and difficult to 
assess” (p. 13). If that is the case, then naturally the task of performance measurement as it is 
carried out within a framework of NPM or generic management accountability will also become 
ambiguous and difficult. It is all the more incumbent on the public sector to find ways of 
rendering the implementation of management control techniques more relevant to the context at 
hand. It will also be necessary for Pigouvian policy-makers to decide carefully what law-
breaking means and what means are most likely to prevent law-breaking. In the context of 
BFCA, these metrics have been boiled down to H1B wages. 
 It is on this ground that Berland and Dreveton’s (2006) article is most open to critique. 
The authors argued that management controls systems in the public sector are a means 
“managers to display their will to take efficiency concerns into account” (p. 14). However, the 
manner in which this will does or does not get translated into results on the ground depends 
largely on the rank and file of the public sector organization a question, an issue that Berland and 
Dreveton (2006) did not discuss. Instead, the discussion of NPM performed by Berland and 
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Dreveton is at a managerial and administrative level, and does not take notice of variables such 
as organizational culture, motivations and demotivations for workers, and other ground-level 
factors that mediate between the implementation of management controls and visible positive 
results.   
 To some extent, the blindness of public sector management controls theories to the role 
and importance of human resources is an embedded problem, one that Gow (2005) recognized 
when he wrote that: “In the federal public service, quality was first sought through efficient 
people. After five decades of predominant attention to processes, the rise of management 
thinking and program budgeting in the late 1960s led to concern with results” (p. 2). There is a 
disconnection between the notion of results and performance on an abstract level and the ground-
level activities needed to achieve efficiency. 
 According to Gow (2005), there are a number of ways in which public sector 
organizations are trying to implement controls. There are six areas to which particular attention 
is directed: (a) Policy and programs capacity, (b) human potential, (c) risk management, (d) 
stewardship of resources, (e) accountability, and (f) citizen-centered service. Gow’s level of 
analysis was more detailed than that of the overview provided by Berland and Dreveton (2006), 
much of which was concerned with theories of management and the effort to demonstrate that 
management controls in the public sector are real and not merely symbolic. In addition, Gow did 
not draw on very specific implementation studies, as Berland and Dreveton did, but rather tried 
to provide an overview of the entire trend of thinking and practice on management accountability 
in the public sector. 
 Gow (2005) traced the full history of the quest for efficiency in North American 
government, arguing that the main theme has been a transition from “stifling central controls” (p. 
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7) to a more discretionary system. At its core, the quest for efficiency in the public sector has 
revolved around the detection of value for money (Gow, p. 7). Gow argued that, today, the 
orientation of North American public sector management thinking is best summarized as Total 
Quality, which encompasses equal and simultaneous performance in the realms of (a) Policy and 
programs capacity, (b) human potential, (c) risk management, (d) stewardship of resources, (e) 
accountability, and (f) citizen-centered service. The addition of human-centered elements (for 
example, in acknowledging the central importance of both customers and public sector 
employees) is what makes Total Quality different from past paradigms of public sector 
management.  
 There is, of course, a timeless economic tradeoff between efficiency and equity, and this 
tradeoff can be seen as a dynamic underlying the evolution of American public sector 
management thinking and practice. Public services have typically been seen as centers for 
delivering efficiency at the expense of equity. That is, in terms of linear programming, American 
public sector management has sought to maximize efficiency while minimizing expenditure. 
This approach has two important implications for customers. The first implication is a positive 
one. If taxpayers get more for their money, then government is being accountable to them. 
However, another way to look at the situation is that, if efficiency is maximized, then satisfaction 
(equity) may go down, in that citizens cannot simultaneously receive efficient and extremely 
comprehensive service. If, for example, a particular department of the public sector wishes to 
raise efficiency by performing 300 rather than 200 service requests a day, then it may be the case 
that the overall quality of service will go down.    
 In the public sector, management accountability is a way to improve the efficiency of an 
organization, often an organization that has not been subject to scrutiny and pressures to change. 
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Berland and Dreveton (2006) and Gow (2005) made this point. However, as Gow pointed out, at 
some point North American thinking about managerial controls in the public sector underwent a 
change: “In the federal public service, quality was first sought through efficient people. After 
five decades of predominant attention to processes, the rise of management thinking and program 
budgeting in the late 1960s led to concern with results” (p. 2). 
 Berland and Dreveton (2006) made a similar point about New Public Management 
(NPM), which is characterized by automation, an increase of services to the citizens, and 
organizational change to support these services. For Berland and Dreveton, NPM is primarily a 
method of business process management (BPM), with special attention to performance 
measurement and cost management control.  While these process-oriented aspects of 
management controls in the public sector are clearly of great importance, there is some merit to 
the original idea that quality is also a product of “efficient people” (Gow, 2005, p. 2). Employees 
and customer matter; their relationships represent the link between the government and the 
citizenry. Unfortunately, moving to a process and results emphasis with the important of 
employees diluted has led to some service failures. Some failures of this kind were documented 
by Berland and Dreveton, who portrayed a public sector so obsessed with the outer framework of 
New Public Management (NPM) that it seemed to forget the importance of people in actually 
carrying out that agenda.  
 The purpose of the public sector is citizen service (Bevir, 2010). It is true that, in 
providing this service, public sector organizations must keep costs low, service provision 
efficient, and processes robust (Smith, 2006). However, the first-order goal is to satisfy citizens, 
and all the other goals are subordinate to it. One of the more interesting aspects of the BFCA is 
that it is a rare example of a government program that is at least partly designed to uphold the 
   
47 
interests of non-citizens (H1B holders) against the interests of citizens (employers of H1B 
holders). In this sense, BFCA is an example of NPM conceived on a global basis; by attempting 
to define and enforce what is best for a complex ecosystem of both citizens and non-citizens, 
BFCA can be seen not only as an example of NPM as defined by Berland and Dreveton (2006) 
but also a form of Pigouvian regulation. Just as Arthur Pigou (2001)[1932] argued that regulation 
ought to apply to entire ecosystems (including future generations, the biosphere, etc.), BFCA is 
also classifiable as an ecosystem-level program. BFCA’s regulations are not narrowly defined as 
citizen-defense versus non-citizen-exploitation, which has long been a key theme in American 
labor history, but as a means of ensuring that American citizens and non-citizens play what game 
theorists would call a cooperative game. 
 One of the unresolved questions in New Public Management theory is whether there is a 
tradeoff between the efficiency of the government and the efficiency of the private sector. In 
other words, if the government becomes more efficient at enforcing labor law, does it means that 
companies, now forced to pay wages that are below what the market might bear, are less 
efficient? That was the position defended by Coase (1960). Although this study does not contain 
any research questions or hypotheses to address this issue, it is one that could be discussed by 
future researchers. 
Agency Theory 
Pigou (2001)[1932] and Coase (1960) offered specific approaches to agency theory, 
which can be thought as a way to model (a) how parties interact with each other, (b) why they 
interact with each other in the ways that they do, (c) where the limits of free action lie, and (d) 
how the interactions could change if subject to a different set of rules.   
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Coercion 
 Coercion is a theme in labor regulation for two reasons: (a) Self-interest and (b) the 
nature of the state. Coercion is a theme in regulation because, on the part of policy-makers and 
legislative policy-makers, there are no naïve assumptions of compliance. This approach is rooted 
in a long tradition of political philosophy, going back at least to Aristotle, in which the state 
recognizes the propensity of its subjects to rebel, and therefore builds provisions for enforcement 
and punishment directly into laws. Coercion can be thought of an extension of the philosophy of 
realism as applied to politics.  
 Technically speaking, governments do not directly coerce either businesses or individual 
workers to either take or refrain from taking specific actions. Instead, what is common is for 
governments to create a framework of incentives and disincentives to determine behavior. In 
liberal democracies in particular, this approach exists because governments circumscribe their 
own power. In Communist polities, for example, it was not uncommon for the government to 
apply genuine and direct means of coercion to business behavior, such as stationing troops in 
factories (Krugman & Wells, 2009). In liberal democracies, the idea of direct coercion is 
replaced by indirect coercion, in which it is assumed that a framework of incentives and 
disincentives will impel businesses to govern themselves, without requiring an actually present 
threat of force or surveillance from the government. This approach is more efficient, because the 
government does not have to task its resources to direct coercion, and can take more of a role in 
auditing compliance and punishing rule-breakers, two processes that require far less manpower 
than governing business directly. Philosophically, too, these ideas are rooted in traditions of 
political culture that are deeply rooted in the fabric of American life. For example, the political 
philosophies of both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke—two philosophers whose work has 
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influenced American political philosophy—placed a great emphasis on the consent of the 
governed (Krugman & Wells, 2009).  
 In addition to political culture and preferences, geography has to be considered. America 
grew to political maturity as a frontier state. For much of the country’s history, the reach of the 
federal government did not extend much beyond Washington, D.C., and it was not until the Civil 
War that string traditions of federalism were embedded in American political practice. However, 
even after the Civil War, American policy-makers and federal government authorities have been 
loath to coerce businesses (Krugman & Wells, 2009).  
Self-Interest 
 Another theory of great importance in labor regulation is that of self-interest. Self-interest 
theory as it applies in the labor market dates back to Adam Smith’s (1801)[1776] The Wealth of 
Nations, which gave rise to the now-common definition of economic self-interest as the 
minimization of risk and the maximization of profit (this concept is so universal in the 
neoclassical economic literature that it is typically abbreviated to minimax). It is important to 
recognize how revolutionary the minimax concept was when Smith introduced it. At the time, 
the governing theory of self-interest in much of the West was a variation on what Thomas 
Aquinas had written in 1259, namely that a good person should only accumulate a modest level 
of wealth and that “sin consists in…trying to acquire or retain riches beyond this limit” (p. 31). It 
might now seem quaint to us that the ideas of wealth and sin could have been so closely 
associated, but that is only because we live in a world in which the values of Adam Smith 
prevailed over those of Thomas Aquinas. As late as the 20
th
 century, many British economists—
such as Pigou (2001)[1932]—and their counterparts on the Continent were still deeply 
influenced by Aquinas and also by Aristotle (2004), who had written:  
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It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and 
the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent 
disposition. Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a 
thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and 
not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not 
the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess...(p. 56). 
Clearly, then, the idea of minimax self-interest was a radical break with the past models of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, in which self-interest was held to be bounded by duty to God and society.  
This idea, although proposed by the Scottish academic Smith (1801)[1776], was ultimately most 
influential in America, partly because of a frontier ethos in which the individual was not as 
closely integrated with society as was the case in Europe and much of the rest of the world. 
 Self-interest is a floating concept; it does not work in the same way in all societies, and it 
can mean quite different things even to people who are in similar positions. However, what cases 
of self-interest have in common with each other is the concept of what Adams (1976) called 
equity. Equity, as applied to either individuals or businesses, is the idea should get back at least 
as much as what is put in to any productive activity. America has always been a land of hard 
work, for both good and ill. It is perhaps natural that workers who were prepared to work 90 
hours a week at backbreaking industrial labor, as well as business owners who built empires with 
great effort and at substantial risk, should demand more of the world. Adams’  theory predicted 
that people who either put more in to their work, or who perceive themselves as doing so, will be 
more aware and protective of their self-interest than people who are doing the minimum.  
 It is surely easy to condemn the American companies that, as late as the early 20
th
 
century, were using child labor in mines and busting up unions. According to Morton (1905), a 
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union activist, “If any one wants to know what this non-union business is, let them ask me. Tell 
any one inquiring that it is nothing but slavery here” (as quoted in International Typographical 
Union 1905, p. 403). However, the theory of self-interest in general and the theory of equity in 
particular suggests that companies, no less than individuals, will do at least as much as what they 
will get away with in the pursuit of what Smith (1801) identified as the minimax goal. It is not 
just the case that the market itself is configured to support minimax strategies; people (and 
businesses) also have strong psychological affinities to the idea of minimizing their risk and 
maximizing their benefit, even at the expense of others, because of the perceptions (a) that their 
hard work deserves recompenses and (b) others are also acting selfishly (Adams, 1976).     
Game Theory 
 The previous sub-sections of the literature review have offered a glimpse into how the 
two themes of coercion and self-interest have helped to determine how workers and businesses 
have responded to law and legislation pertaining to labor. It was not until relatively recently in 
the history of politics and economics that a single theoretical framework arose to model both 
coercion and self-interest. This model was implicit in Smith’s (1801) [1776] idea that market 
reality was determined by the cumulative interactions of millions of market players, but it was 
not given a mathematical formulation until after World War II. The model is known as game 
theory, and is associated with thinkers such as John von Neumann, Oskar Morgenstern, and John 
Nash (Krugman & Wells, 2009). 
 Game theory is a set of mathematical principles—with applications to economics, 
politics, and even biology—that seeks to both understand and predict the actions of agents 
(which can be individuals, companies, nations or any other sort of decision-making entity) in 
response to other agents. There are many permutations of game theory. However, the two 
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insights of game theory that are most directly relevant to this study are those of cooperative and 
non-cooperative games. Gilles (2010, p. 5) offered a compelling definition of both of these kinds 
of games, as follows:  
The non-cooperative approach…assumes that each player in a game is driven by a 
well-formulated goal. This goal is formalized as the player’s payoff function… 
Each player now optimizes her payoff by selecting actions that are under her 
control…non-cooperative game theory is the most pristine expression of the 
principle of methodological individualism that lies at the foundation of most of 
contemporary microeconomics. The second fundamental approach is known as 
cooperative game theory and allows players to write binding contracts. This 
changes the analysis and interpretation of a game radically. Indeed, if binding 
agreements can be written, all players collectively will pursue the maximization 
of the total wealth that can be generated within the social decision situation at 
hand. A binding contract then determines how this generated wealth is distributed 
among the various players in this interaction decision situation. 
It should be immediately apparent that the concept of non-cooperative and cooperation map on to 
the related concepts of self-interest and coercion. When parties have a shared self-interest, game 
theory suggests that they will ally themselves in the form of a cooperative game in order to best 
apportion the benefits, and minimize the risks, of a given action. In this sense, it is possible to 
think of cooperative game theory as a merely a multi-person version of the minimax theory that 
Smith (1801) applied to individuals. However, cooperation requires a complex set of rules of its 
own. In particularly, cooperation requires some set of rules that establish baseline levels of 
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profit- and risk-sharing that are acceptable to all parties. Coase (1960) described such rules as 
originating from open-market negotiation. 
 On the other hand, when a basis for shared self-interest is absent, then the game is non-
cooperative; the players are out to maximize rewards and minimize risks for themselves, 
regardless of the impact on other players. In practice, it is rare to encounter non-cooperative 
games that play out in very large marketplaces, such as the employment marketplaces, because 
no society is libertarian enough to allow players to organize their own actions and responses with 
complete freedom. In the labor market, hybrid games—games that are somewhere between pure 
cooperation and pure non-cooperation—are the rule. 
 Consider the case of minimum wage. In a situation of this sort, the natural self-interest of 
the employer is to pay as little as possible, while the natural self-interest of the worker is be paid 
as much as possible. There is no shared ground for a cooperative game in this instance, which is 
why it is so simple to observe highly selfish behavior on the part of both employers and 
employees. The difference in this dynamic, from country to country, is the role of government. 
The United States, for example, is a liberal—rather than libertarian—democracy in which the 
rights of individuals to contract are limited by what collective opinion considers to be fair, stable, 
and sustainable behavior. Thus, in the U.S., no worker can contract to work for less than 
minimum wage. By the same token, the U.S. also has laws that constrain the power of labor 
unions. The framework of law and policy thus intercedes between the self-interest of the 
employer and the self-interest of the worker to try to enable harmony. 
 Of course, intercession can take numerous forms, which is where it is appropriate to 
mention the philosophical controversy between supporters of Pigou’s (2001)[1932] and Coase’s 
(1960) approaches. In Pigou’s opinion, the economic self-interest of individuals is both strong 
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and inherently non-cooperative. Therefore, because a fair common ground cannot be found by 
letting each party act as it wishes, government must exercise a heavy hand in directing the 
actions and responses of economic agents. On the other hand, Coase (1960) argued that it is more 
efficient for the government to refrain from coercion and to wait in the background while 
economic agents come to a consensus between themselves. In this sense, Coase can be said to 
have trusted the philosophy of laissez faire markets whereas Pigou was suspicious of them. 
While both of these theorists were supporters of liberal democracy and capitalism, Coase skewed 
more closely to the libertarian idea that the best solution is a pure market solution, while Pigou  
clearly believed in something more akin to state-managed capitalism, even if it could not be 
called socialism.  
Applying Agency Theory to American Labor History 
 Noya and Clarence (2007) defined the social economy as “the space between the market 
and the state” (p. 10). It is this interstitial nature of the social economy that prompts theorists to 
refer to the social economy as the “third sector” (Fontan & Shragge, 2000, p. 1). Historically, 
one of the functions of the social economy has been to negotiate the ways in which both the 
market and the state, often colluding, have structured what Everling (1997) calleds “social space 
and time” (p. 29). Everling (1997) argued that the logic of capitalism requires an “intensification 
of labor” (p. 29) in order to achieve ever-higher concentrations of surplus. It is this consideration 
that has driven capitalists to claim more of the social space and time of workers, specifically by 
imposing difficult conditions on them. 
 One of the triumphs of the labor movement, a crucial component of the social economy, 
has been to contest and redefine the limits of social space and time in a more equitable and 
modern way. In particular, the history of labor activism over the latter half of the nineteenth 
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century is dominated by labor’s attempt to delimit the workday in ways that respect the worker 
as a modern person (e.g., with commitments to leisure, self, and family outside of work) in 
contrast with capitalism’s rearguard attempt to keep the worker caught in a pre-modern paradigm 
of drudgery. In a sense, then, the goal of nineteenth-century capitalism was to institute modernity 
at the level of physical assets, but to keep human assets trapped and exploited in a medieval 
version of labor slavery. In the study of these conflicts, it is possible to identify the moment at 
which Pigou’s (2001)[1932] theory triumphed over  Coase’s (1960) theory in the application of 
labor policy, and to identify the process of compromise between different kinds of agency 
(including the agency of workers, employers, and the government) that gave rise to modern 
American labor regulations.   
 One of the issues that is prominent in today’s H1B discussions is about the length of an 
H1B-holder’s working day, and the conditions of work (including wages). Indeed, such working 
conditions have always been subject to the demands of specific kinds of labor, whose character 
has been determined either by the laws of nature or the goals of production. For example, 
activities that depend heavily on climate, precipitation, etc. are guided by nature, and workers 
must align their productive effort accordingly. However, after the Industrial Revolution of the 
early nineteenth century, the demands of the capitalist form of production took precedence over 
natural rhythms. 
 Fitch’s (1911) contemporary account of workers in America related that the question of 
apportioning the working day was quite complicated, because of the novelty of the machinery 
and form of production. Technology made it possible to keep a steel mill going at full force for 
twenty-four hours a day, a prospect that no doubt delighted capitalists. The question was how to 
assign human resources to the mill so as to ensure an optimal level of productivity.  Fitch (1911) 
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related that one solution was to create three shifts of employees, working for stretches of eight 
hours at a time (p. 167), but notes that this method had a disadvantage rooted in the fact that 
“heating furnaces cannot be allowed to grow cold, lest they crack...it has become even more 
important that there shall be as little waiting time as possible” (p. 166).   When the economy was 
primarily agricultural, the working day was generally between sunrise and sunset (Rogers & 
Bliss, 1890, p. 159). When the economy became dominated by industry, there was no such thing 
as a ‘natural’ working day. The machines of industry roared night and day, without a break, 
forcing hapless laborers to follow in their wake, lest even the temporary idleness of the machines 
lead to a decline in profit for capitalists. 
 The roots of the twelve-hour workday were in the early nineteenth century, when 
capitalists decided that having two shifts of laborers as opposed to three created fewer risks of 
lost productivity and asset degradation. However, quite naturally, laborers rebelled against the 
idea. Twelve hours of work in an industrial setting is exhausting. William Green (1898) of the 
American Federation of Labor documented a number of efforts in industries such as printing, 
woodworking, painting, decorating, tailoring, and street railway work to move to an eight- or 
nine-hour workday (p. 246), indicating that what might have been a particular quibble of steel 
mill workers in the early 1800s had by now spread to almost all workers in America.  It is 
interesting to note that, as late as 1898, the ten- or twelve-hour workday remained prevalent in so 
many industries. Many scholars have argued, as per Van Horn and Schaffner (2003), that “The 
twelve-hour workday appears to have persisted in the majority of the private sector at least until 
the Civil War” (p. 643), but contemporary accounts suggest that the long workday persisted at 
least all the way to the end of the nineteenth century and, in pockets, well into the middle of the 
twentieth century. 
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 The seeds of labor activism in opposition to the long workday were rooted in a new, 
modern conception of labor, one in which the laborer was entitled to “greater leisure time... 
health, and self improvement” (Van Horn and Schaffner, p. 643). This conception of labor is an 
extension of agency theory, as it sees what the workers want, and how they go about getting it, as 
genuine extensions of workers’ desires. These themes were relatively new in labor history, and 
comprised the core of subsequent activism. The Interchurch World Movement of North America 
(1921) noted that, in a contemporary strike in Pittsburgh, “the desire of foreign workingmen to 
become Americanized and [learn] English after a twelve hour workday” (p. 114) constituted one 
of the causes of action. In the U.S., there has been a long history of H1B workers having been 
exploited by being made to made long hours, often with little or no pay for this extra work 
(Krugman & Wells, 2009).    
Conclusion of the Literature Review 
  One of the reasons that any study of H1B policy is both difficult and rewarding is that 
this topic is conceptually connected to many different topics, theories, and themes. One of the 
main purposes of this literature review has been to demonstrate the existence of two highly 
influential theories that describe common approaches to business regulation in general and labor 
policy in particular: The frameworks of Coase (1960) and Pigou (2001)[1932]. Coase’s laissez 
faire approach can be seen to be the ascendant approach in U.S. labor policy until well into the 
20
th
 century, when the U.S. government largely allowed businesses to pursue their own terms of 
engagement with workers. However, the twentieth century tipped the policy emphasis of the U.S. 
government away from the laissez-faire approach to an approach that was more interventionist 
and oriented towards social justice; in other words, towards a Pigouvian approach. Even as the 
U.S. economy retained a bias towards certain forms of laissez faire activity, the Pigouvian 
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approach spread through many aspects of economic policy (Krugman & Wells, 2009). As 
Krugman and Wells (2009) pointed out, most governments have Pigouvian policies on paper, but 
the lack of efficiency in detecting and punishing infractions means that corporations continue to 
get away with illegal behavior; thus, New Public Management, by promoting efficiency, is a 
means of ensuring that Pigouvian policies actually function in the real world of business.     
 BFCA is an example of a Pigouvian policy, for a number of reasons. To begin with, 
BFCA is clearly predicated on managing the actions of actors—particularly business actors—in a 
way that suggests that government does not trust these actors to arrive at rational and efficient 
arrangements on their own. Second, BFCA assumes, as Pigou (2001)[1932] did, that the easiest 
way to alter the behavior of actors is to threaten them with punitive action, such as fines, 
imprisonment, and other sanction. Third, BFCA is attuned to broad needs; it is not there just to 
serve its citizen clients, namely U.S. companies, but also to serve H1B holders, often against the 
economic interests of U.S. hirers. In this orientation, the BFCA recalls Pigou’s exhortation that 
governments ought to serve the interests of people who cannot defend themselves, even when 
such people are not direct stakeholders in government.   
 BFCA can also be seen as a way to enforce what Gilles (2010) and other game theorists 
have called cooperative game play, which fails unless it is based on binding contracts. BFCA is 
the provider and enforcer of the binding contract; as long as it plays this role with integrity, then 
H1B holders and H1B hirers can come together to obtain the benefits of  cooperation. With these 
points in mind, it it possible to turn to the methodology of the study.  
 It is not necessarily appropriate to pit the theories of Coase (1960) and Pigou 
(2001)[1932] directly against each other because, as Krugman and Wells (2009) have argued, 
almost every policy environment is a blend of Pigouvian and Coasean approaches. There are 
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some aspects of business to which governments take a laissez faire attitude, and others that are 
very closely regulated. In those terms, it is not the purpose of this study to try to empirically 
settle the debate of Coasean versus Pigouvian theory, but rather to attempt to detect a specific 
operation of the general principle discussed by Krugman and Wells (2009), namely that 
democratic policy environments are a blend of Coasean and Pigouvian effects. In this case, it is 
expected that the government will demonstrate its Pigouvian orientation through the successful 
coercion of Virginia businesses to comply with the BFCA, but that businesses will exercise their 
right of freedom in another sphere of economic life—the right to not hire higher-paid workers—
to counter-act Pigouvian policy. Thus, one of the purposes of this study is to determine whether 
this sort of point-counterpoint between Pigouvian government policy and Coasean business 
responses to that policy can be glimpsed through the lens of a statistical case study. For policy-
makers, the main significance of a study of this kind is not an affirmation that either Pigou or 
Coase  was right, but rather an illustration of the principle that Pigouvian policy can prompt 
Coasean counter-responses from businesses.  
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 The first research question is: How has the advent of the BFCA impacted the tempo of 
H1B hiring in Virginia? Hiring tempo is a concept that will be operationalized as the mean 
number of hires per employer. If Coase (1960) was right, then there should be an observed 
slowdown in the tempo of H1B hiring after BFCA (the topic of research question one), because 
this action is the most obvious way of preventing H1B employers from having to pay the higher, 
mandated wages for H1B workers. Simply put, if companies do not hire H1B workers, then they 
do not have to worry about paying these workers more; presumably, they can design work 
processes so that existing H1B workers shoulder more work, or distribute the work in some other 
way. This question is also connected to cost-benefit and organizational behavior modification 
theories surveyed in chapter two. The research hypothesis is that the hiring tempo in Virginia 
before BFCA was greater than the hiring tempo after BFCA. In essence, the first research 
hypothesis presumes that BFCA was successful in curtailing rogue H1B hiring across Virginia. 
By holding employers to stricter standards, it is hypothesized that BFCA cut down false or 
fraudulent H1B hires. The null hypothesis is that the hiring tempo was the same before and after 
BFCA. The alternative hypothesis is that the hiring tempo before BFCA was not equal to the 
hiring tempo after BFCA.  
 The second research question is: How has the advent of the BFCA influenced prevailing 
H1B wages in Virginia? The second research hypothesis proposes that, after BFCA, the mean 
prevailing H1B wage has been driven up because there are fewer illegal and off-book workers 
who will work for less money.  This research question ties in to theories about cost-benefit 
analysis as they apply both to individual workers and the risks they take when working, and to 
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companies and the risks they take while hiring. The null hypothesis for this research question is 
that the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia was the same before and after BFCA. The 
alternative hypothesis is that the mean prevailing H1B wage before BFCA was not equal to the 
mean prevailing H1B wage after BFCA.  
  The third research question is: How has the advent of the BFCA influenced employer-
proposed H1B wages in Virginia? The research hypothesis associated with the third research 
question proposes that, BFCA, the mean employer-proposed  H1B wage has been driven up 
because there are fewer illegal and off-book workers who will work for less money.  The null 
hypothesis is that was no difference in employer-proposed wages before and after BFCA, and the 
alternative hypothesis is that the employer-proposed wages before BFCA were not equal o the 
employer-proposed wages after BFCA.  
 If Pigou (2001)[1932] was right, then, in terms of the second and third research 
questions, it should be expected that H1B employers in Virginia did in fact raise their actual and 
proposed H1B wages in order to be in compliance with the law. Pigou’s theory implies that, the 
more credible the threat of government sanction, the more likely it is that employers will alter 
their behavior; in the U.S., with its strong and relatively efficient central government, it is to be 
expected that corporations would take the threat of government sanctions (e.g., penalties, 
imprisonment, etc.) seriously and change their behavior in consequence. However, if Coase 
(1960) is right, then it will also be the case that employers will take free-market actions to recoup 
any losses brought about through the threat of government sanction, a possibility that was 
designed to be addressed in research question one. These assumptions tie directly into the 
research questions.   
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Population and Sample 
 The population for this study consisted of all H1B employers in the state of Virginia. The 
sampling strategy requires further discussion and justification, as there were some 
methodological difficulties in assembling the data. To begin with, it should be noted that there is 
one source of state-level H1B hiring data that also contains wage data broken down by 
profession: The Foreign Labor Certification (FLC) Data Center Online Wage Library, which 
holds a contract from the U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Foreign Labor Certification. FLC 
does not offer rolled-up state-wide data. Data is only available from (a) individual counties or 
townships or from (b) parts of the state that are recognized as distinct economic areas by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. The data is the same in both cases; it is just organized in a more 
granular fashion in the county/township version of the database. The BLS version of the database 
contains 15 areas; the county-township view has nearly 100 entries. Clearly, then, the easiest 
way to get data for the whole state is to sample the sum of the BLS areas rather than adding 
together the over 100 county-township views. Because the FLC database goes not give all wage 
information for Virginia, it is necessary to calculate this information by hand, by adding together 
the data for each of the 15 BLS areas in the FLC database. 
 The second sampling issue has to do with occupations. The U.S. Department of Labor 
sorts H1B holders into well over 100 distinct job occupations. Given that each of these 
occupations can exist in each of the 15 BLS areas, there are over 1,500 combinations of 
occupation title and BLS area data. Some sampling strategy is clearly necessary to window down 
the data into a format that allows for convenient testing. In other words, it is necessary to sample 
specific H1B professions from the FLC database in order to be able to determine how the mean 
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hires, prevailing wages, and employer-proposed for these professions changed before and after 
BFCA. 
 The sampling approach taken in this study was purposive. Only occupations pertaining to 
computer professions and technology were selected. This sampling strategy was warranted 
because H1B holders are typically clustered into the computer field, whether as software 
engineers, analysts, programmers, etc. The seven occupational categories chosen for the study 
were as follows: Computer systems analysts (CSA); computer programmers (CPROG); software 
developers, applications (SDA); software developers, systems (SDS); database administrators 
(DBAs); network administrators and system administrators (NetSySs); and computer support 
specialists (CSUP). It should be noted that this delimitation of the study means that the results 
cannot be generalized to non-computer-related fields.   
Independent and Dependent Variables 
 The independent variable, or treatment, is the passage of BFCA and the dependent 
variables include H1B wage and hiring information as laid out in the research questions. 
Relationships between IVs and DVs will be modeled by linear regression equations in the fourth 
chapter of the study. 
Statistical Tests 
 The main statistical test employed will be a series of independent samples t-test, at p < 
.05, to determine whether the differences in before- and after-BFCA means in H1B hiring, 
prevailing wage, and employer-suggested wage are meaningful. If the differences are 
meaningful, then the conclusion is that BFCA has done its job in cutting down rogue use of the 
H1B function and also in protecting foreign workers from exploitation. However, correlation 
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analysis and linear regression will also be used to examine the data set in ways that cast 
complementary light on the findings from the research questions.  
Threats to, and Protections of, Validity  
 The main threat to validity is that factors other than BFCA can be shown to be 
responsible for wage and employer offer trends in the post-2006 timeframe. Since the purpose of 
this study is to isolate and quantify BFCA’s affect on post-2006 wage and offer trends, the threat 
that non-BFCA factors could be responsible for any detected affects is a grave one. However, the 
threat can be managed by accounting for U.S. economic growth in the post- and pre-BFCA 
timeframe. In this study, 2006 was treated as a canonical year, with the U.S. GDP per capita in 
that year being assigned an index value of 100. For subsequent years, both U.S. GDP per capita 
and inflation were rendered on this scale. For example, if both U.S. GDP per capita and inflation 
were 3% higher in 2007, than in 2006, the index value for 2007 would be 106. Consider, for 
example, that the index value for 2002 was 97. Wages in each of these years could be compared 
to each other on the 2006 index. A wage of $20 per hour in 2002, would, by this method, be 
transformed into $19.40, while a wage of $25 in 2007 would become $26.50. Applying this 
method allowed for the affects of inflation and economic growth to be factored out of the dollar 
wages. Thus, if the study were to disclose that a CSUP H1B worker made $25 in 2007 but $27 in 
2008, this increase of $2 will already have had inflation- and economic growth-related affects 
taken out of it. It is still conceivable that factors other than inflation, economic growth, and 
BFCA had some role to play in observed changes in H1B wages and employer offers, which 
should be considered a potential limitation of the study. 
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Detailed Overview of Hypothesis Testing 
 The research questions will be evaluated singly. Each research was answered by means 
an independent samples t-test that compared the before-BFCA years (2002, 2003, 2004, and 
2005) to the after-BFCA years (2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010) in the sample. The threshold for 
significance was p < .05.  
Research Question 1 
 The first research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA impacted the tempo of 
H1B hiring in Virginia? In this research question, the concept of tempo is operationalized as the 
number of hires per employer. The null hypothesis for the first research question is that the mean 
hires per employer in Virginia before BFCA = the mean hires per employer in Virginia after 
BFCA. The alternative hypothesis for the first research question is that the mean hires per 
employer in Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean hires per employer in Virginia after BFCA. The 
research hypothesis for the first research question is that the mean hires per employer in Virginia 
before BFCA > the mean hires per employer in Virginia after BFCA.  
 The research hypothesis represents the presumption that BFCA was successful in 
curtailing rogue H1B hiring across Virginia; by holding employers to stricter standards, it is 
hypothesized that BFCA cut down false or fraudulent H1B hires. This research question, like the 
others, was statistically explored by means of an independent samples t-test with an Alpha level 
of 95%. The dual purpose of this t-test was to (a) identify the difference in means between the 
before- and after-BFCA years and (b) determine whether this difference was statistically 
significant.  
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Research Question 2 
 The second research question posed in the study is as follows: How has the advent of the 
BFCA influenced prevailing H1B wages in Virginia? Rendered in mathematical terms, the null 
hypothesis associated with the second research question is that the mean prevailing H1B wage in 
Virginia before BFCA is equal to  the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia after BFCA. The 
alternative hypothesis associated with the second research question is that the mean prevailing 
H1B wage in Virginia before BFCA is not equal to the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia 
after BFCA.  
 The research hypothesis associated with the second research question is that the mean 
prevailing H1B wage in Virginia before BFCA < the mean prevailing H1B wage in Virginia 
after BFCA. The presumption contained in this research hypothesis is that, because BFCA would 
have curtailed the ability of employers to hire H1B employers at lower-than-prevailing wage 
rates, the average wage of H1B employees would have gone up in the period following the 
implementation of BFCA. 
 This research question was examined in precisely the same way as the other two research 
questions. The sample was divided into before- and after-BFCA data, then the data were 
compared to each other through an independent samples t-test with significance determined by p 
< .05. T-tests will be conducted separately for each one of the seven professions that were 
examined in this study. Each t-test is followed a brief statement summarizing its significance. 
The results will be discussed in greater depth in chapter five, which is the conclusion of the 
study. 
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Research Question 3 
 The third research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA influenced employer-
proposed H1B wages in Virginia? The null hypothesis associated with this research question is 
that the mean employer-proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA is equal to the mean employer-
proposed wage in Virginia after BFCA. The alternative hypothesis associated with this research 
question is that the mean employer-proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA is not equal to the 
mean employer-proposed wage in Virginia after BFCA.  
 The research hypothesis associated with this research question is that the mean employer-
proposed wage in Virginia before BFCA is less than the mean employer-proposed wage in 
Virginia after BFCA. As with the second research question, the presumption contained in the 
research hypothesis is that, in the aftermath of BFCA, American employers were obliged to 
propose higher wages; the second research question was designed to test whether, in addition to 
merely proposing higher wages to H1B workers, American employers also had to pay higher 
wages in fact.  
 As with the previous two research questions, the third research question will be explored 
by means of a series of t-tests. In order to conduct these t-tests, the data were first divided into 
before- and after-BFCA categories. The wages in each category were then compared to each 
other, with the observed differences between means subject to the usual test of statistical 
significant (p < .05). T-tests were conducted for each of the seven H1B occupations examined in 
this study. Each t-test was followed by a brief summary of significant, with fuller discussion of 
the results (and their relevance to scholarship and recommendations) to follow in chapter five, 
and a summary of hypothesis testing for the research questions to follow immediately after 
assessment of the third research question.  
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Linear Regression Analysis 
 Linear regression analysis was performed in order to quantify the relationships between 
(a) proposed wages and actual wages and (b) actual wages and offers. Each analysis will be 
accompanied by a linear regression equation. The purpose of the first group of linear regression 
equations is to offer a means of calculating actual wages if proposed wages are known. This 
information is not merely of academic interest; it would be highly useful to H1B applicants, H1B 
job brokers, and H1B employers who are attempting to determine, on the basis of limited 
evidence, where the eventual market rate for a given H1B occupation might settle. In this way, 
linear regressions adds more value to the evaluation of the data set. 
 The purpose of the second group of linear regression equations is to quantify the 
relationships between actual wages and per-employer offers. This information could be of use 
the H1B stakeholders as an additional means of predicting wages. If the demand for positions—
which can be operationalized as the number of offers made by companies for particular H1B 
positions—is known, then it should be possible to calculate the actual wage for that occupation, 
as long as the significance of the linear regression is high enough.  
 Thus, while it might seem as if both the linear regression and the correlation analyses are 
adjuncts to the main research questions, it is clear that both are of high practical value. This 
information can be used by anyone—whether policy-maker, employee, or employer—who is a 
stakeholder in the H1B hiring process. Moreover, the methodology can be easily duplicated by 
researchers working with data in states other than Virginia.     
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Hypothesis Testing Table 
Table 2 
Hypothesis Testing Summary 
Research Question Hypotheses Results 
 
Research Question 
1: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
impacted the tempo 
of H1B hiring in 
Virginia? 
 
H10: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA = the mean hires 
per employer in Virginia after BFCA; 
H1A: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean hires 
per employer in Virginia after BFCA; 
H1R: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA < the mean hires 
per employer in Virginia after BFCA 
 
 
Research Question 
2: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
influenced prevailing 
H1B wages in 
Virginia? 
H20: Actual wages in Virginia before 
BFCA = actual wages in Virginia after 
BFCA; 
H2A: Actual wages in Virginia before 
BFCA ≠ actual wages in Virginia after 
BFCA; 
H2R: Actual wages in Virginia before 
BFCA < actual wages in Virginia after 
BFCA 
 
 
Research Question 
3: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
influenced 
employer-proposed 
H1B wages in 
Virginia? 
H30: Proposed wages in Virginia before 
BFCA = proposed wages in Virginia 
after BFCA; 
H3A: Proposed wages in Virginia 
before BFCA ≠ proposed wages in 
Virginia after BFCA; 
H3R: Proposed wages in Virginia 
before BFCA < proposed wages in 
Virginia after BFCA 
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Chapter Four: Presentation and Discussion of Results 
 This chapter is structured as follows. First, the research questions of the study are 
repeated, and their results summarized. This analysis takes place on a research question-by-
research question basis. Afterwards, there is a more general exploration of the data set, including 
correlation and linear regression analysis, with the purpose of deriving formulas that allow actual 
wages to be predicted from proposed wages, formulas that would be of  use to job seekers, 
consultants, and others who can benefit from a better understanding of the connection between 
proposed and actual wages. It should be noted that the descriptive statistics of the sample appear 
in Appendix A; while not necessary to the exploration of the research questions, these 
descriptive statistics have been disclosed for reasons of research completeness, as recommended 
by Creswell (2009).    
Analysis of Research Questions 
 The research questions will be evaluated singly. Each research was answered by means 
an independent samples t-test that compared the before-BFCA years (2002, 2003, 2004, and 
2005) to the after-BFCA years (2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010) in the sample. The threshold for 
significance was p < .05. In terms of results, the advent of the BFCA in Virginia was associated 
with: A slowdown in the tempo of hiring of all computer science positions except those of DBA 
and CPROG;  a rise in the actual wages for all of the computer science job descriptions; and a 
rise in the proposed wages for all of the computer science job descriptions. Cumulatively, these 
results suggest that the Pigouvian BFCA strategy worked as intended in modifying the behavior 
of H1B hirers, and that hirers employed the Coasean strategy of reducing their total number of 
hired employees in order to insulate themselves from the higher wages that had to be paid after 
BFCA.  
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Overview of Research Question 1 
 The first research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA impacted the tempo of 
H1B hiring in Virginia? The operationalization and hypothesis testing rules of this research 
question were described in chapter three. The results of the data analysis demonstrated that 
BFCA was associated with a slowdown in the hiring tempo (measured by the metric of average 
job offers per employer) of all of the computer science professions examined in this study, with 
the exception of the DBA and CPROG positions. These results indicate that, for the most part, 
the Pigouvian strategy of the government worked in changing the behavior of H1B hirers in 
Virginia, who, faced with the prospect of having to pay higher wages or coming under legal 
sanction, chose the Coasean response of hiring fewer H1B workers. In other words, the H1B 
employers chose a free-market solution to the government’s regulatory strategy. 
Overview of Research Question 2 
 The second research question posed in the study is as follows: How has the advent of the 
BFCA influenced prevailing H1B wages in Virginia? The results indicated that the advent of 
BFCA was associated with the payment of higher wages to each of the computer science 
professions profiled in this study. These findings strongly supported the contention that the 
government’s Pigouvian strategy of altering employer behavior through the threat of sanctions 
was effective. 
Overview of Research Question 3 
 The third research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA influenced employer-
proposed H1B wages in Virginia? The results indicated that the advent of BFCA was associated 
with the proposal of higher wages to each of the computer science professions profiled in this 
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study. These findings also strongly supported the contention that the government’s Pigouvian 
strategy of altering employer behavior through the threat of sanctions was effective. 
Detailed Analysis of Research Question 1 
 The first research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA impacted the tempo of 
H1B hiring in Virginia? This question was examined on a position-by-position basis. In other 
words, there was a separate hiring tempo analysis for each of the seven computer science 
professions examined in this study. These analyses were independent samples t-tests conducted 
in SPSS ™ software, version 18.0. Each independent samples t-test consists has the same 
structure; once this structure is understood, it is possible to summarize the results of each table in 
a single sentence. The meaningful components of the independent samples t-test are: (a) The 
mean for each of the two cases (meaning before BFCA years and after BFCA years) in the 
analysis; and (b) the significance value that appears in the t-test equality of means section. The 
mean indicates the number of per-employer offers for a given computer science position in both 
before- and after-BFCA years. The significance (with the standard cutoff of <  .05) indicates 
whether these observed differences are statistically significant.  
 The other data values in the readouts are important to reproduce in order to render the 
entire analysis transparent and achieve the methodological goal of maximum disclosure in 
quantitative studies as recommended by Creswell (2009) and other methodological authorities, 
but only the two values discussed here—namely, means (M) and significant (p)—truly matter.  
This explanation should also be kept in mind for the other independent samples t-tests that are 
employed in this study. With the explanation in mind, it is possible to present the results for each 
of the independent samples t-tests for hiring tempo in each of the seven professions, considered 
before and after BFCA. 
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Table 3 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, CSA 
  
  Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
 
 
Before 
BFCA 
4 7.8825 .71004 .35502 
After BFCA 4 5.8050 .37009 .18505 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CSA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
5.836 .052 5.189 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
5.189 4.518 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CSA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.002 2.07750 .40035 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.005 2.07750 .40035 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CSA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
1.09788 3.05712 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
1.01445 3.14055 
 
There was a significant decrease in the tempo of CSA hiring after BFCA (from M = 7.8825 to M 
= 5.805, p = .002).  
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Table 4 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, CPROG 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 8.2125 .43691 .21846 
After 
BFCA 
4 7.7075 .22411 .11205 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CPROG_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.855 .391 2.057 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
2.057 4.476 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CPROG_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.085 .50500 .24552 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.101 .50500 .24552 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CPROG_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
-.09576 1.10576 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.14899 1.15899 
 
There was not a significant decrease in the tempo of CPROG hiring after BFCA (from M = 
8.2125 to M = 7.7075, p = .085).  
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Table 5 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, SDA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 7.1925 .24281 .12141 
After 
BFCA 
4 6.6175 .27741 .13871 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.005 .947 3.119 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
3.119 5.897 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.021 .57500 .18433 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.021 .57500 .18433 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.12395 1.02605 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.12203 1.02797 
 
There was a significant decrease in the tempo of SDA hiring after BFCA (from M = 7.1925 to M 
= 6.6175, p = .021).  
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Table 6 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, SDS 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 5.2225 .53269 .26634 
After 
BFCA 
4 3.9425 .31952 .15976 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDS_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
1.929 .214 4.121 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
4.121 4.911 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDS_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.006 1.28000 .31058 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.010 1.28000 .31058 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDS_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.52003 2.03997 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.47726 2.08274 
 
 
There was a significant decrease in the tempo of SDS hiring after BFCA (from M = 5.2225 to M 
= 3.9425, p = .006).  
   
77 
Table 7 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, DBA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 4.1175 .32796 .16398 
After 
BFCA 
4 3.7825 .12010 .06005 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
DBA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
1.883 .219 1.918 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
1.918 3.790 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
DBA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.104 .33500 .17463 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.131 .33500 .17463 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DBA_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
-.09231 .76231 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-.16061 .83061 
 
There was not a significant decrease in the tempo of DBA hiring after BFCA (from M = 4.1175 
to M = 3.7825, p = .104). 
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Table 8 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, NetSys 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 3.1000 .09967 .04983 
After 
BFCA 
4 2.3475 .18283 .09141 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
Net_Sys_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
4.954 .068 7.228 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
7.228 4.638 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
Net_Sys_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.000 .75250 .10411 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.001 .75250 .10411 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% CI 
Lower Upper 
Net_Sys_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.49774 1.00726 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.47847 1.02653 
 
There was a significant decrease in the tempo of NetSys hiring after BFCA (from M = 3.1 to M = 
2.3465, p = .000). 
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Table 9 
Independent Samples T-Test, Hiring Tempo Before and After BFCA, CSUP 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 6.6150 .41653 .20827 
After 
BFCA 
4 5.5375 .45515 .22757 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CSUP_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.007 .935 3.493 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
3.493 5.953 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CSUP_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.013 1.07750 .30849 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.013 1.07750 .30849 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CSUP_Offers Equal variances 
assumed 
.32266 1.83234 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.32123 1.83377 
 
There was a significant decrease in the tempo of CSUP hiring after BFCA (from M = 6.6150 to 
M = 5.5375, p = .013). 
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Detailed Analysis of Research Question 2 
 The second research question posed in the study is as follows: How has the advent of the 
BFCA influenced prevailing H1B wages in Virginia? This research question was answered by 
the use of independent samples t-tests conducted on each computer science position separately. 
Table 10 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, CSA 
  Case N Mean SD SE Mean 
 
 
Before BFCA 4 25.3850 .57773 .28886 
After BFCA 4 28.4100 .93509 .46755 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene’s Test t-test for Means Equality  
F Sig. t df 
CSA_$ Equal variances 1.378 .285 -5.504 6 
Unequal variances   -5.504 4.999 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. Mean Difference Std. Error Difference 
CSA_$ Equal variances .002 -3.02500 .54958 
Unequal variances .003 -3.02500 .54958 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval  
Lower Upper 
CSA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.36978 -1.68022 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-4.43783 -1.61217 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for CSA after BFCA (from M = $25.385 per 
hour to M = $28.41 per hour, p = .002).  
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Table 11 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, CPROG 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 18.3550 .64944 .32472 
After 
BFCA 
4 20.6425 1.25309 .62654 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CPROG_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
4.342 .082 -3.242 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.242 4.503 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CPROG_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.018 -2.28750 .70569 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.027 -2.28750 .70569 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CPROG_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.01426 -.56074 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-4.16342 -.41158 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for CPROG after BFCA (from M = $18.355 per 
hour to M = $20.6425 per hour, p = .018).  
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Table 12 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, SDA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 23.5175 .98838 .49419 
After 
BFCA 
4 26.6650 1.23162 .61581 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.286 .612 -3.986 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.986 5.731 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.007 -3.14750 .78959 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.008 -3.14750 .78959 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-5.07955 -1.21545 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.10172 -1.19328 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for SDA after BFCA (from M = $23.5175 per 
hour to M = $26.665 per hour, p = .007).  
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Table 13 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, SDA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 28.8250 1.17248 .58624 
After 
BFCA 
4 31.4525 .99875 .49937 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDS_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.553 .485 -3.412 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.412 5.852 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDS_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.014 -2.62750 .77010 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.015 -2.62750 .77010 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDS_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.51186 -.74314 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-4.52347 -.73153 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for SDS after BFCA (from M = $28.825 per 
hour to M = $31.4525 per hour, p = .014).  
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Table 14 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, DBA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 23.8550 .86431 .43216 
After 
BFCA 
4 26.7675 1.44995 .72498 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
DBA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.961 .365 -3.451 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.451 4.893 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
DBA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.014 -2.91250 .84401 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.019 -2.91250 .84401 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DBA_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.97771 -.84729 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.09644 -.72856 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for DBA after BFCA (from M = $23.855 per 
hour to M = $26.7675 per hour, p = .014).  
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Table 15 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, NetSys 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 25.3975 .65490 .32745 
After 
BFCA 
4 27.7850 1.14060 .57030 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
NetSys_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
1.762 .233 -3.631 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.631 4.784 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
NetSys_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.011 -2.38750 .65762 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.016 -2.38750 .65762 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
NetSys_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-3.99664 -.77836 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-4.10117 -.67383 
 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for NetSys after BFCA (from M = $25.3975 per 
hour to M = $27.785 per hour, p = .011).  
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Table 16 
Independent Samples T-Test, Actual Wages Before and After BFCA, CSUP 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
B FCA 
4 16.4575 .43169 .21585 
After 
BFCA 
4 17.8075 .66334 .33167 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CSUP_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.835 .396 -3.411 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-3.411 5.155 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CSUP_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.014 -1.35000 .39572 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.018 -1.35000 .39572 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CSUP_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-2.31830 -.38170 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-2.35813 -.34187 
 
 
There was a significant increase in actual wages for CSUP after BFCA (from M = $16.4575 per 
hour to M = $17.8075 per hour, p = .014).  
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Detailed Analysis of Research Question 3 
 The third research question is:  How has the advent of the BFCA influenced employer-
proposed H1B wages in Virginia? This research question was answered by the use of 
independent samples t-tests conducted on each computer science position separately 
Table 17 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, CSA 
Case N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Before BFCA 4 24.2071 .32963 .16482 
After BFCA 4 28.2124 .98007 .49003 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Variances t-test for Means 
F Sig. t df 
CSA_Prop_$ Equal variances 5.326 .060 -7.747 6 
Unequal variances   -7.747 3.670 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. Mean Difference SE Difference 
CSA_Prop_$ Equal variances .000 -4.00527 .51701 
Unequal variances .002 -4.00527 .51701 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CSA_Prop_
$ 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-5.27034 -2.74020 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.49305 -2.51749 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for CSA after BFCA (from M = $24.2071 
per hour to M = $28.2124 per hour, p = .002).  
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Table 18 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, CPROG 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 17.3637 .44097 .22048 
After 
BFCA 
4 20.5921 1.27635 .63817 
 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CPROG_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
8.810 .025 -4.782 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-4.782 3.706 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CPROG_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.003 -3.22842 .67519 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.011 -3.22842 .67519 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CPROG_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.88055 -1.57630 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.16315 -1.29370 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for CPROG after BFCA (from M = $17.3637 
per hour to M = $20.5921 per hour, p =.011).  
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Table 19 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, SDA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 22.0306 1.12960 .56480 
After 
BFCA 
4 25.5764 1.12520 .56260 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.006 .942 -4.448 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-4.448 6.000 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.004 -3.54573 .79720 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.004 -3.54573 .79720 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-5.49640 -1.59507 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.49641 -1.59506 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for SDA after BFCA (from M = $22.0306 
per hour to M = $25.5764 per hour, p =.004).  
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Table 20 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, SDS 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 27.1339 .56882 .28441 
After 
BFCA 
4 30.0486 1.12822 .56411 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
SDS_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
4.493 .078 -4.614 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-4.614 4.433 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
SDS_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.004 -2.91467 .63175 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.008 -2.91467 .63175 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
SDS_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.46051 -1.36883 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-4.60320 -1.22614 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for SDS after BFCA (from M = $27.1339 per 
hour to M = $30.0486 per hour, p =.008).  
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Table 21 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, DBA 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 22.3983 .75636 .37818 
After 
BFCA 
4 26.1168 .94423 .47212 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
DBA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.040 .847 -6.147 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-6.147 5.727 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
DBA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.001 -3.71843 .60491 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.001 -3.71843 .60491 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
DBA_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-5.19859 -2.23828 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.21585 -2.22101 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for DBA after BFCA (from M = $22.3983 
per hour to M = $26.1168 per hour, p =.008).  
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Table 22 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, NetSys 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 23.4864 .28654 .14327 
After 
BFCA 
4 26.8295 1.20049 .60024 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality 
of Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
NetSys_Prop_
$ 
Equal variances 
assumed 
7.615 .033 -5.417 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-5.417 3.341 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
NetSys_Prop_
$ 
Equal variances 
assumed 
.002 -3.34302 .61711 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.009 -3.34302 .61711 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
NetSys_Prop_
$ 
Equal variances 
assumed 
-4.85302 -1.83301 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-5.19833 -1.48770 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for NetSys after BFCA (from M = $23.4864 
per hour to M = $26.8295 per hour, p =.009).  
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Table 23 
Independent Samples T-Test, Proposed Wages Before and After BFCA, CSUP 
Case 
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Before 
BFCA 
4 15.0238 .78017 .39008 
After 
BFCA 
4 17.2738 .66121 .33061 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
Levene's Test for Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of 
Means 
F Sig. t df 
CSUP_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.072 .798 -4.400 6 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
  
-4.400 5.843 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
CSUP_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
.005 -2.24999 .51134 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
.005 -2.24999 .51134 
 
Independent Samples Test 
 
t-test for Equality of Means 
95% Confidence Interval of 
the Difference 
Lower Upper 
CSUP_Prop_$ Equal variances 
assumed 
-3.50119 -.99880 
Equal variances not 
assumed 
-3.50939 -.99060 
 
There was a significant increase in proposed wages for NetSys after BFCA (from M = $15.0238 
per hour to M = $17.2738 per hour, p =.005).  
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Further Testing of the Data 
 The previous section of chapter contained hypothesis testing pertaining to the three stated 
research questions of the study. This section contains further statistical exploration of the data. 
These explorations are related to the research questions; collectively, they case more light on the 
shifts in employer behavior after BFCA. The further testing takes two forms: (a) Correlation 
analysis and (b) linear regression analysis. The correlation analysis will explore possible links 
between variables in the study; where such links are significant (at p < .05), linear regression will 
be used to quantify the relationship between variation in the chosen independent variable (IV) 
and variation in the chosen dependent variable (DV). Every result will be interpreted in plain 
language that relates the finding to the study. Again, it should be noted that this testing is not 
directly related to the research questions, but is still necessary as a means of informing H1B 
applicants, consultants, and other stakeholders about how actual wages can be predicted from 
proposed wages. Thus, the further testing still has a place in this study, although a place that is 
distinct from the formal hypothesis testing.  
Correlation Analysis 
 Correlation analysis centered on two sets of relationships: (a) The relationship between 
actual wages and proposed wages for each of the seven occupational categories and (b) the 
relationship between actual wages and per-employee offers.  In each of these correlations, there 
are two key figures. The first key figure is the Pearson correlation, which measures the 
correlation of the relationship (on a sliding scale from -1, indicating perfect negative of 
correlation, to 1, indicating perfect positive correlation, and with 0 indicating perfect absence of 
correlation). The second key figure is the Sig. (p value of this relationship).  
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 The Correlation between Actual Wages and Proposed Wages 
Table 24 
Correlation Analysis, CSA Actual Wages and CSA Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 CSA_$ CSA_Prop_$ 
CSA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .990
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
CSA_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.990
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .990, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the CSA position and the actual wages for the CSA position. 
Employers’ proposals in this occupational category were thus not out of line with market reality.  
Table 25 
Correlation Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and CPROG Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 CPROG_$ CPROG_Prop_$ 
CPROG_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .982
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
CPROG_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.982
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
There was a very high and significant correlation (R = .982, p < .001) between the employer-
proposed wages for the CPROG position and the actual wages for the CPROG position.  
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Table 26 
Correlation Analysis, SDA Actual Wages and SDA Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 SDA_$ SDA_Prop_$ 
SDA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .997
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
SDA_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.997
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .997, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the SDA position and the actual wages for the SDA position. 
Employers’ proposals in this occupational category were thus not out of line with market reality.  
Table 27 
Correlation Analysis, SDS Actual Wages and SDS Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 SDS_$ SDS_Prop_$ 
SDS_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .951
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
SDS_Prop_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
.951
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .951, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the SDS position and the actual wages for the SDS position. 
Employers’ proposals in this occupational category were thus not out of line with market reality.  
Table 28 
Correlation Analysis, DBA Actual Wages and DBA Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 DBA_$ DBA_Prop_$ 
DBA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .960
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
DBA_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.960
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .960, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the DBA position and the actual wages for the DBA position. 
Employers’ proposals in this occupational category were thus not out of line with market reality.  
Table 29 
Correlation Analysis, NetSys Actual Wages and NetSys Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 NetSys_$ NetSys_Prop_$ 
NetSys_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .976
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
NetSys_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.976
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
   
98 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .976, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the NetSys position and the actual wages for the NeySys position.  
Table 30 
Correlation Analysis, CSUP Actual Wages and CSUP Proposed Wages 
Correlations 
 CSUP_$ CSUP_Prop_$ 
CSUP_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 .973
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
CSUP_Prop_
$ 
Pearson 
Correlation 
.973
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .973, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the NetSys position and the actual wages for the CSUP position. 
Employers’ proposals in this occupational category were thus not out of line with market reality. 
 The Correlation between Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
 This section of the correlation analysis examines the relationship between the actual 
wages offered to H1B holders and the mean number of H1B offers per employer for each of the 
seven occupational categories in this study. If the trends identified in the research questions hold, 
then the expectation would be for an inverse relationship between job offers and actual wages; in 
other words, employers are likely to be making fewer job offers as wages go up, and more job 
offers as wages go down. This expectation was corroborated for all but two of the occupational 
categories, those of DBA and CSUP, perhaps indicating that these positions might have been of 
enough strategic importance to justify high employer demand regardless of wage levels. This 
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data is not relevant to the research questions, but it is still helpful for H1B applicants, 
consultants, and others interested in the link between actual and proposed H1B wages.    
Table 31 
Correlation Analysis, CSA Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 CSA_$ CSA_Offers 
CSA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.970
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 
N 8 8 
CSA_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.970
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
There was an almost perfectly inverse and highly significant (R = -.970, p < .001) relationship 
between CSA actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers 
for this category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. The same pattern was 
observed to hold in the other correlation analyses.  
Table 32 
Correlation Analysis, CPROG Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 CPROG_$ CPROG_Offers 
CPROG_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.768
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .026 
N 8 8 
CPROG_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.768
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .026  
N 8 8 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.768, p = .026) relationship between CPROG 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
Table 33 
Correlation Analysis, SDA Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 SDA_$ SDA_Offers 
SDA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.728
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .041 
N 8 8 
SDA_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.728
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .041  
N 8 8 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.728, p = .041) relationship between SDA 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010.  
Table 34 
Correlation Analysis, SDS Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 SDS_$ SDS_Offers 
SDS_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.718
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .045 
N 8 8 
SDS_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.718
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .045  
N 8 8 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.718, p = .045) relationship between SDS 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
Table 35 
Correlation Analysis, DBA Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 DBA_$ DBA_Offers 
DBA_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.597 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .118 
N 8 8 
DBA_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.597 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .118  
N 8 8 
 
DBA was one of only two occupations for which the observed correlation between actual wage 
and per-employer offers was not significant (R  -.597, p = .118). It is possible that the lack of 
significant correlation had to do with higher generic demand for DBAs.  
Table 36 
Correlation Analysis, NetSys Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 NetSys_$ Net_Sys_Offers 
NetSys_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.933
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .001 
N 8 8 
Net_Sys_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.933
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001  
N 8 8 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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There was an almost perfectly inverse and highly significant (R = -.933, p = .001) relationship 
between NetSys actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer 
offers for this category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
Table 37 
Correlation Analysis, CSUP Actual Wage and Mean Per-Employer Offers   
Correlations 
 CSUP_$ CSUP_Offers 
CSUP_$ Pearson 
Correlation 
1 -.705 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .051 
N 8 8 
CSUP_Offers Pearson 
Correlation 
-.705 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .051  
N 8 8 
 
 
The correlation between CSUP wage and per-employer offers was not significant, by the 
narrowest of margins (R = -.705, p  .051). As with DBAs, it might have been the case that the 
demand for CSUPs remained higher than that for the other occupations during the period under 
study. 
Linear Regression Analysis 
 Linear regression analysis was performed in order to quantify the relationships between 
(a) proposed wages and actual wages and (b) actual wages and offers. Each analysis will be 
accompanied by a linear regression equation. The purpose of the first group of linear regression 
equations is to offer a means of calculating actual wages if proposed wages are known. This 
information is not merely of academic interest; it would be highly useful to H1B applicants, H1B 
job brokers, and H1B employers who are attempting to determine, on the basis of limited 
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evidence, where the eventual market rate for a given H1B occupation might settle. In this way, 
linear regressions adds more value to the evaluation of the data set. 
 The purpose of the second group of linear regression equations is to quantify the 
relationships between actual wages and per-employer offers. This information could be of use 
the H1B stakeholders as an additional means of predicting wages. If the demand for positions—
which can be operationalized as the number of offers made by companies for particular H1B 
positions—is known, then it should be possible to calculate the actual wage for that occupation, 
as long as the significance of the linear regression is high enough.  
 Thus, while it might seem as if both the linear regression and the correlation analyses are 
adjuncts to the main research questions, it is clear that both are of high practical value. This 
information can be used by anyone—whether policy-maker, employee, or employer—who is a 
stakeholder in the H1B hiring process. Moreover, the methodology can be easily duplicated by 
researchers working with data in states other than Virginia. 
 In terms of theory, there are some relevant connections that can be drawn between the 
extra data analysis (that is, the correlations and linear regression) and the theoretical framework 
of the study. For example, the fact that there was an almost perfect positive correlation between 
proposed and actual wages indicates that Virginia employers are fully aware that they will come 
under sanctions if they proposed wages that there are lower than those mandated by BFCA. 
Thus, the correlations can be seen as more support for the proposition—which was also 
examined through the research questions—that the Pigouvian government strategy of altering 
organizational behavior through the threat of sanctions is effective.      
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 Linear Regressions, Proposed and Actual Wages 
Table 38 
Linear Regression Analysis, CSA Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CSA_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .990
a
 .981 .978 .26511 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSA_Prop_$ 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 21.504 1 21.504 305.972 .000
a
 
Residual .422 6 .070   
Total 21.926 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSA_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6.438 1.173  5.487 .002 
CSA_Prop_$ .781 .045 .990 17.492 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CSA_$ = (CSA_Prop_$) (.781) + 6.438.      
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Table 39 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CPROG_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .982
a
 .963 .957 .31659 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CPROG_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 15.840 1 15.840 158.033 .000
a
 
Residual .601 6 .100   
Total 16.441 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CPROG_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.775 1.177  4.059 .007 
CPROG_Prop_
$ 
.776 .062 .982 12.571 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CPROG_$ = (CPROG_Prop_$) (.776) + 4.775.      
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Table 40 
Linear Regression Analysis, SDA Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 SDA_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .997
a
 .994 .993 .16505 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDA_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 27.131 1 27.131 995.919 .000
a
 
Residual .163 6 .027   
Total 27.295 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDA_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.432 .689  4.983 .002 
SDA_Prop_
$ 
.910 .029 .997 31.558 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: SDA_$ = (SDA_Prop_$) (.910) + 3.432.      
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Table 41 
Linear Regression Analysis, SDA Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 SDS_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .951
a
 .904 .888 .57777 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDS_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 18.921 1 18.921 56.682 .000
a
 
Residual 2.003 6 .334   
Total 20.924 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDS_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 3.490 3.546  .984 .363 
SDS_Prop_$ .932 .124 .951 7.529 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: SDS_$ = (SDS_Prop_$) (.932) + 3.490.      
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Table 42 
Linear Regression Analysis, SDA Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 DBA_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .960
a
 .921 .908 .58025 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DBA_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.493 1 23.493 69.778 .000
a
 
Residual 2.020 6 .337   
Total 25.513 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), DBA_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 4.541 2.495  1.820 .119 
DBA_Prop_
$ 
.856 .103 .960 8.353 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: DBA_$ = (DBA_Prop_$) (.856) + 4.541.      
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Table 43 
Linear Regression Analysis, NetSys Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 NetSys_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .976
a
 .952 .944 .36340 
a. Predictors: (Constant), NetSys_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 15.798 1 15.798 119.628 .000
a
 
Residual .792 6 .132   
Total 16.590 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), NetSys_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 7.319 1.767  4.143 .006 
NetSys_Prop_
$ 
.766 .070 .976 10.937 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: NetSys_$ = (NetSys_Prop_$) (.766) + 7.319.      
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Table 44 
Linear Regression Analysis, CSUP Proposed Wages and Actual Wages 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CSUP_Prop_$
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .973
a
 .946 .937 .22337 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSUP_Prop_$ 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.225 1 5.225 104.720 .000
a
 
Residual .299 6 .050   
Total 5.524 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSUP_Prop_$ 
b. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 6.997 .994  7.042 .000 
CSUP_Prop_
$ 
.628 .061 .973 10.233 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CSUP_$ = (CSUP_Prop_$) (.628) + 6.997. 
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 Linear Regressions, Actual Wages and Offers 
Table 45 
Linear Regression Analysis, CSA Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CSA_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .970
a
 .942 .932 .46204 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSA_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 20.645 1 20.645 96.705 .000
a
 
Residual 1.281 6 .213   
Total 21.926 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSA_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 36.469 .987  36.953 .000 
CSA_Offers -1.399 .142 -.970 -9.834 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CSA_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CSA_$ = (CSA_Offer) (-1.399) + 36.469. 
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Table 46 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CPROG_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .768
a
 .590 .521 1.06042 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CPROG_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.694 1 9.694 8.621 .026
a
 
Residual 6.747 6 1.124   
Total 16.441 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CPROG_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 41.815 7.610  5.495 .002 
CPROG_Offers -2.804 .955 -.768 -2.936 .026 
a. Dependent Variable: CPROG_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CPROG_$ = (CPROG_Offer) (-2.804) + 41.815. 
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Table 47 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 SDA_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .728
a
 .530 .451 1.46274 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDA_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 14.457 1 14.457 6.757 .041
a
 
Residual 12.838 6 2.140   
Total 27.295 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDA_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 50.484 9.783  5.161 .002 
SDA_Offers -3.678 1.415 -.728 -2.599 .041 
a. Dependent Variable: SDA_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: SDA_$ = (SDA_Offer) (-3.678) + 50.484. 
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Table 48 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 SDS_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .718
a
 .515 .434 1.30057 
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDS_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 10.775 1 10.775 6.370 .045
a
 
Residual 10.149 6 1.691   
Total 20.924 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), SDS_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 37.282 2.867  13.002 .000 
SDS_Offers -1.559 .618 -.718 -2.524 .045 
a. Dependent Variable: SDS_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: SDS_$ = (SDS_Offer) (-1.559) + 37.282. 
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Table 49 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 DBA_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .597
a
 .356 .249 1.65439 
a. Predictors: (Constant), DBA_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 9.091 1 9.091 3.322 .118
a
 
Residual 16.422 6 2.737   
Total 25.513 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), DBA_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 40.812 8.525  4.787 .003 
DBA_Offers -3.924 2.153 -.597 -1.823 .118 
a. Dependent Variable: DBA_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: DBA_$ = (DBA_Offer) (-3.924) + 40.812. 
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Table 50 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 Net_Sys_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .933
a
 .870 .848 .59928 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Net_Sys_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 14.435 1 14.435 40.194 .001
a
 
Residual 2.155 6 .359   
Total 16.590 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Net_Sys_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 35.801 1.468  24.387 .000 
Net_Sys_Offers -3.381 .533 -.933 -6.340 .001 
a. Dependent Variable: NetSys_$ 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: NetSys_$ = (NetSys_Offer) (-3.381) + 35.801. 
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Table 51 
Linear Regression Analysis, CPROG Actual Wages and Per-Employer Offers 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables 
Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 1 CSUP_Offers
a
 . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model 
R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate 
1 1 .705
a
 .497 .413 .68056 
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSUP_Offers 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.745 1 2.745 5.927 .051
a
 
Residual 2.779 6 .463   
Total 5.524 7    
a. Predictors: (Constant), CSUP_Offers 
b. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 22.542 2.235  10.087 .000 
CSUP_Offer
s 
-.890 .366 -.705 -2.435 .051 
a. Dependent Variable: CSUP_$ 
 
 
The linear regression equation is as follows: CSUP_$ = (CSUP_Offer) (-.890) + 22.542. 
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Conclusion of Findings: Summary of Hypothesis Testing and Other Results 
 The following three tables contain the results of the hypothesis testing associated with the 
study’s research questions as well as a summary of the findings from the overall statistical 
exploration. All of the findings will be placed in greater context in chapter five, the conclusion of 
the study. 
Table 52 
Hypothesis Testing Summary 
Research 
Question 
Hypotheses Results Theoretical 
Implications 
 
Research Question 
1: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
impacted the tempo 
of H1B hiring in 
Virginia? 
 
H10: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA = the mean 
hires per employer in Virginia 
after BFCA; 
H1A: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA ≠ the mean 
hires per employer in Virginia 
after BFCA; 
H1R: Mean hires per employer in 
Virginia before BFCA < the mean 
hires per employer in Virginia 
after BFCA 
 
 
Null hypothesis could not be 
rejected for DBA and 
CPROG hiring; 
Null hypothesis could not be 
accepted for all other 
occupations; 
Strong support for the 
research hypothesis, except 
for DBA and CPROG 
occupations 
 
 
Coasean responses to 
Pigouvian sanctions 
can protect 
corporations 
Research Question 
2: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
influenced 
prevailing H1B 
wages in Virginia? 
H20: Actual wages in Virginia 
before BFCA = actual wages in 
Virginia after BFCA; 
H2A: Actual wages in Virginia 
before BFCA ≠ actual wages in 
Virginia after BFCA; 
H2R: Actual wages in Virginia 
before BFCA < actual wages in 
Virginia after BFCA 
 
Null hypothesis could not be 
accepted for any of the 
occupations; 
Strong support for the 
research hypothesis 
The Pigouvian 
approach is effective in 
altering the behavior of 
corporations to be 
more respectful of 
worker rights and 
governmental 
regulations.  
Research Question 
3: How has the 
advent of the BFCA 
influenced 
employer-proposed 
H1B wages in 
Virginia? 
H30: Proposed wages in Virginia 
before BFCA = proposed wages in 
Virginia after BFCA; 
H3A: Proposed wages in Virginia 
before BFCA ≠ proposed wages in 
Virginia after BFCA; 
H3R: Proposed wages in Virginia 
before BFCA < proposed wages in 
Virginia after BFCA 
 
Null hypothesis could not be 
accepted for any of the 
occupations; 
Strong support for the 
research hypothesis 
The Pigouvian 
approach is effective in 
altering the behavior of 
corporations to be 
more respectful of 
worker rights and 
governmental 
regulations. 
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Table 53 
Summary of Other Statistical Analyses of the BFCA Data: Correlations 
Correlation Analysis Results 
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .990, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the CSA position and the actual wages for the CSA position.  
 
There was a very high and significant correlation (R = .982, p < .001) between the employer-
proposed wages for the CPROG position and the actual wages for the CPROG position.  
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .997, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the SDA position and the actual wages for the SDA position. 
  
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .951, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the SDS position and the actual wages for the SDS position.  
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .960, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the DBA position and the actual wages for the DBA position.  
 
There was an extremely high and significant correlation (R = .976, p < .001) between the 
employer-proposed wages for the NetSys position and the actual wages for the NeySys position.  
 
There was an almost perfectly inverse and highly significant (R = -.970, p < .001) relationship 
between CSA actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers 
for this category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010.  
 
There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.768, p = .026) relationship between CPROG 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
 
There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.728, p = .041) relationship between SDA 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010.  
 
There was a highly  inverse and significant (R = -.718, p = .045) relationship between SDS 
actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer offers for this 
category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
 
DBA was one of only two occupations for which the observed correlation between actual wage 
and per-employer offers was not significant (R  -.597, p = .118). It is possible that the lack of 
significant correlation had to do with higher generic demand for DBAs.  
 
There was an almost perfectly inverse and highly significant (R = -.933, p = .001) relationship 
between NetSys actual wage and per-employer offers, indicating that employers made fewer 
offers for this category when wages went up in the post-BFCA era of 2007-2010. 
 
The correlation between CSUP wage and per-employer offers was not significant, by the 
narrowest of margins (R = -.705, p  .051). 
   
120 
Table 54 
Summary of Other Statistical Analyses of the BFCA Data: Linear Regressions 
Linear Regression Analysis Results 
 
CSA_$ = (CSA_Prop_$) (.781) + 6.438.     
  
CPROG_$ = (CPROG_Prop_$) (.776) + 4.775 
 
SDA_$ = (SDA_Prop_$) (.910) + 3.432.      
 
SDS_$ = (SDS_Prop_$) (.932) + 3.490.      
 
DBA_$ = (DBA_Prop_$) (.856) + 4.541. 
 
NetSys_$ = (NetSys_Prop_$) (.766) + 7.319.      
 
CSUP_$ = (CSUP_Prop_$) (.628) + 6.997. 
 
CSA_$ = (CSA_Offer) (-1.399) + 36.469. 
 
CPROG_$ = (CPROG_Offer) (-2.804) + 41.815. 
 
SDA_$ = (SDA_Offer) (-3.678) + 50.484. 
 
SDS_$ = (SDS_Offer) (-1.559) + 37.282. 
 
DBA_$ = (DBA_Offer) (-3.924) + 40.812. 
 
NetSys_$ = (NetSys_Offer) (-3.381) + 35.801. 
 
CSUP_$ = (CSUP_Offer) (-.890) + 22.542. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 The conclusion contains the following sections: (a) A discussion of the context and 
meaning of the findings; (b) a relation of the findings to the theories discussed in chapter two; 
and (c) recommendations. The main conclusions is as follows: H1B employers in Virginia 
 employed the Coasean strategy of hiring fewer H1B workers in five of seven common computer 
science professions, as a response to the success of the government’s Pigouvian approach of 
altering H1B hirers’ wage policies through the threat of sanction. In other words, the Pigouvian 
approach was a successful form of behavioral modification, and also encouraged hirers to resort 
to free-market measures, such as reduced hiring, to lower the burden imposed on them by 
Pigouvian policies.  
Context and Meaning of the Findings 
 The debate on immigration in America has been full-throated, intense, and unremitting 
for centuries, even before the founding of America itself. Beginning in the late 16
th
 century, the 
America that we now know began as a haven for immigrants from Europe, particularly Britain. 
The indigenous peoples of North America, the Native Americans, now represent a tiny and 
shrinking minority of the country’s population. 
 To an outside observer, it would seem that immigration—particularly immigration for 
economic purposes, which has loomed so large in the nation’s history—would long since have 
become an uncontroversial part of American life. However, the fact of American immigration is 
in uneasy coexistence with the lingering ideology of American nativism—which is essentially a 
critique of every future generation of immigrants. 
 In terms of policy, the American government has gone back and forth several times. At 
the beginning of the modern era of immigration, beginning in the late 19
th
 century, the 
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government envisioned immigration in racial and social as well as economic terms, enforcing a 
hierarchy of quotas and racist laws. Later, in the 20
th
 century, immigration began to be decoupled 
from racist policies, and laws that were based on color-blind principles such as family 
reunification, increased immigration quotas, and merit-based immigration (including temporary 
immigration, such as that possible on the H1B program) opened the doors to immigrants from 
many countries to live and work in the United States. 
 The issue of racism has never vanished entirely from American immigration policy. 
However, of more relevance in current times is the question of economic discrimination and 
what the government is doing to address it. The fact is that, in America and elsewhere, 
immigration is often subject to extreme power hierarchies that can erode the foundation of 
democracy. Economic immigrants, such as those on the H1B program, are not typically people 
who are possessed of power and wealth; almost invariably, economic workers are people in a 
position of inferiority to their employers. American labor history is full of the story of foreign 
workers who have been exploited in various ways by their employers; such workers have 
historically been underpaid, overworked, forced to do tasks for which they were not contracted, 
and had their rights, dignity, and livelihoods assailed in all manner of ways. 
 None the less, H1B workers are also stakeholders in the American economy. The 
collective labor of these workers is highly important. Because the H1B Visa is only awarded to 
skilled workers, H1B holders can be found holding down important and value-added jobs in 
industry, research, healthcare, and other fields. Moreover, H1B workers provide their skilled 
labor for a cost that is markedly less than that, on average, of American workers. 
 It is clear that the American government, through programs such as BFCA, recognizes 
the value of H1B labor, or else little meaningful effort would be made to ensure that H1B 
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workers are treated fairly. It is possible to lose track of this point when examining the BFCA 
program, which can be easily mistaken for a worker-punitive approach. However, BFCA is much 
better described as an employer-punitive approach, especially when Pigou’s (2001)[1932] 
philosophy is applied. Pigou (2001)[1932] made the point that, by better regulating business 
activity, it was possible to protect future generations from the consequences of unfair business 
operations. In the same way, it is possible to argue that enforcing existing standards for pay and 
employment of H1B workers is a protection of future workers from the inevitable declines in 
wages, and increases in unfair employment practices, that take place when the government is 
insufficiently attentive. 
Relation of Findings to Theories 
 The simplest possible relation of this study’s findings to the theories explored in chapter 
two is to state that the Pigouvian approach worked. After BFCA was introduced, there was 
indeed a statistically significant increase in actual and proposed wages, and a statistically 
significant decrease in per-employer offers, which suggests that the behavior of H1B hirers in 
Virginia was altered by BFCA, at least when it came to the seven occupations examined in this 
study. Had BFCA not been effective, it is unlikely that any of these changes in the data would 
have been observed. Employers would likely have paid less, and offered less, for their H1B 
workers, as they did with more impunity when they were able to undercut wage minimums 
without fear of government sanction. Furthermore, because H1B employers were getting away 
with paying less per H1B worker, they were also making more offers; after BFCA, it was 
observed that the number of offers per company dropped, which was another indication that, by 
using the threat of sanction to bring H1B pay levels back up to norms, BFCA had forced H1B 
hirers to be more efficient with the number of workers they hired.  
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 The first research question was designed to determine whether H1B hirers would use the 
free-market strategy of hiring fewer workers in the wake of higher wage standards; this response 
was the Coasean counterpoint to the Pigouvian strategies whose effectiveness was measured in 
the second and third research questions, which focused on post-BFCA changes in proposed and 
actual wages. Cumulatively, the results showed that Pigouvian strategies worked to alter H1B 
employers’ behavior, but that H1B hirers used Coasean strategies to recoup some of their losses.    
Recommendations 
 The main recommendation warranted by the findings is that the U.S. federal government 
ought to continue to take its Pigouvian approach to regulating the labor of H1B holders. These 
measures are working, insofar as they have resulted in higher actual wages for workers, higher 
proposed wages for workers, and fewer per-employer offers, with each of these findings 
supporting the interpretation that BFCA has lowered rogue H1B hiring and created a strong 
incentive for employers to pay H1B workers a better wage. Moreover, there is no indication that 
any of these policies have hurt the U.S. economy, or the economies of the companies that hire 
H1B workers in Virginia. Going by the data, the combination of higher wages and fewer offers 
suggests that H1B hirers in Virginia simply have to be more circumspect about their hiring. 
Given that the demand of H1B workers still far exceeds the supply, the labor enforcement 
policies enacted through BFCA simply require H1B employers to ensure that they obtain 
efficient use from adequately-paid workers, instead of hoping to cut corners by lowering wages 
and employing H1B workers in an unethical way.  It is also worth noting that, in a free and 
flexible market, employers will likely use Coasean approaches to reduce the impact of Pigouvian 
sanctions. Thus, governments in free-market societies should feel free to use Pigouvian strategies 
without fear that such strategies will needlessly suppress business activity; businesses will 
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simply use some other form of response to mitigate the harms, if any, caused by a Pigouvian 
strategy. 
 In conclusion, the U.S. government achieved the policy goals of BFCA by bringing about 
tangible and significant changes in the economic behavior of H1B hirers in the state of Virginia. 
For foreign workers, the main impact of this change is that H1B holders can expect higher pay 
and less exploitation (in the form of having to be paid less or to be directed to work non-related 
jobs). For American workers, BFCA does not appear to have brought about a significant change, 
since H1B hirers seem to be budgeting similar amounts of money for H1B work; thus, it is 
unlikely that there is a change in hiring dynamics as they pertain to American workers. For 
American employers, the main change is that business leaders have to be more careful about 
apportioning H1B budgets. It is now more difficult for H1B hirers to get away with paying less; 
forced to pay more, hirers appear to be hiring fewer workers, meaning that they are being more 
circumspect and efficient about getting the most work out of hired workers.     
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics 
Table 55 
Complete Descriptive Statistics for Sample 
Statistics 
 CSA_$ CPROG_$ SDA_$ SDS_$ DBA_$ 
N Valid 8 8 8 8 8 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 26.8975 19.4988 25.0913 30.1388 25.3113 
Std. Error of Mean .62572 .54184 .69815 .61126 .67498 
Std. Deviation 1.76982 1.53256 1.97466 1.72892 1.90913 
Variance 3.132 2.349 3.899 2.989 3.645 
Skewness .260 .606 .172 -.192 .519 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 .752 .752 .752 
Kurtosis -1.581 -.651 -.935 -.919 -.689 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 1.481 1.481 1.481 
Range 4.75 4.41 5.80 4.92 5.53 
Minimum 24.76 17.59 22.29 27.56 22.99 
Maximum 29.51 22.00 28.09 32.48 28.52 
Percentiles 25 25.2275 18.2350 23.4100 28.4875 23.5750 
50 26.7200 19.1200 24.8950 30.1400 25.0300 
75 28.5800 21.0000 26.9100 31.7800 26.9500 
 
Statistics 
 NetSys_$ CSUP_$ CSA_Prop_$ CPROG_Prop_$ 
N Valid 8 8 8 8 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 26.5913 17.1325 26.2098 18.9779 
Std. Error of Mean .54429 .31408 .79386 .68551 
Std. Deviation 1.53948 .88835 2.24537 1.93892 
Variance 2.370 .789 5.042 3.759 
Skewness .543 .458 .261 .536 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 .752 .752 
Kurtosis -.639 -.664 -2.067 -1.325 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 1.481 1.481 
Range 4.42 2.60 5.47 5.18 
Minimum 24.76 16.01 23.89 16.80 
Maximum 29.18 18.61 29.36 21.98 
Percentiles 25 25.1550 16.3275 24.0791 17.3446 
50 26.3950 17.0300 25.8664 18.4447 
75 27.9350 17.8975 28.3945 20.9530 
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Statistics 
 SDA_Prop_$ SDS_Prop_$ DBA_Prop_$ NetSys_Prop_$ 
N Valid 8 8 8 8 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 23.8035 28.5913 24.2575 25.1580 
Std. Error of Mean .76498 .62364 .75645 .69335 
Std. Deviation 2.16368 1.76392 2.13957 1.96110 
Variance 4.682 3.111 4.578 3.846 
Skewness -.027 .432 .105 .535 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 .752 .752 
Kurtosis -1.095 -1.099 -1.827 -1.403 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 1.481 1.481 
Range 6.26 5.02 5.65 5.02 
Minimum 20.60 26.32 21.59 23.26 
Maximum 26.85 31.34 27.24 28.28 
Percentiles 25 21.9478 27.2844 22.1901 23.3415 
50 23.7406 28.2578 24.1427 24.6967 
75 25.8343 30.2962 26.2183 27.0139 
 
Statistics 
 CSUP_Prop_$ CSA_Offers CPROG_Offers SDA_Offers 
N Valid 8 8 8 8 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 16.1488 6.8437 7.9600 6.9050 
Std. Error of Mean .48665 .43415 .14841 .13816 
Std. Deviation 1.37646 1.22797 .41976 .39079 
Variance 1.895 1.508 .176 .153 
Skewness -.041 .331 .429 .053 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 .752 .752 
Kurtosis -1.675 -1.643 -1.459 -.247 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 1.481 1.481 
Range 3.59 3.07 1.10 1.23 
Minimum 14.46 5.43 7.50 6.32 
Maximum 18.05 8.50 8.60 7.55 
Percentiles 25 14.6528 5.6750 7.5625 6.5700 
50 16.3234 6.6250 7.8900 7.0000 
75 17.3829 8.2175 8.3775 7.1125 
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Statistics 
 SDS_Offers DBA_Offers Net_Sys_Offers 
N Valid 8 8 8 
Missing 0 0 0 
Mean 4.5825 3.9500 2.7238 
Std. Error of Mean .28140 .10268 .15015 
Std. Deviation .79591 .29042 .42470 
Variance .633 .084 .180 
Skewness .352 1.381 -.187 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 .752 
Kurtosis -1.308 2.006 -2.043 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 1.481 
Range 2.19 .89 1.04 
Minimum 3.56 3.66 2.19 
Maximum 5.75 4.55 3.23 
Percentiles 25 3.9050 3.7175 2.2600 
50 4.4450 3.8850 2.7800 
75 5.4150 4.1125 3.1025 
 
Statistics 
 CSUP_Offers Case 
N Valid 8 8 
Missing 0 0 
Mean 6.0763 1.50 
Std. Error of Mean .24871 .189 
Std. Deviation .70346 .535 
Variance .495 .286 
Skewness -.166 .000 
Std. Error of Skewness .752 .752 
Kurtosis -1.371 -2.800 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 1.481 1.481 
Range 1.89 1 
Minimum 5.01 1 
Maximum 6.90 2 
Percentiles 25 5.4725 1.00 
50 6.0600 1.50 
75 6.8275 2.00 
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Appendix B: Frequencies and Distribution of Statistics 
Table 56 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSA Actual Wages 
 CSA_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 24.76 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
25.11 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
25.58 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
26.09 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
27.35 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
28.01 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
28.77 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
29.51 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 57 
Frequencies and Distribution of CPROG Actual Wages 
CPROG_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 17.59 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
18.06 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
18.76 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
19.01 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
19.23 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
20.01 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
21.33 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
22.00 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 58 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDA Actual Wages 
 
SDA_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 22.29 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
23.21 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
24.01 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
24.56 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
25.23 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
26.19 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
27.15 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
28.09 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 59 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDS Actual Wages 
SDS_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 27.56 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
28.13 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
29.56 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
30.05 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
30.23 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
31.09 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
32.01 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
32.48 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 60 
Frequencies and Distribution of DBA Actual Wages 
DBA_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 22.99 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
23.43 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
24.01 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
24.99 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
25.07 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
26.32 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
27.16 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
28.52 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 61 
Frequencies and Distribution of NetSys Actual Wages 
NetSys_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 24.76 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
25.01 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
25.59 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
26.23 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
26.56 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
27.23 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
28.17 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
29.18 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 62 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSUP Actual Wages 
CSUP_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 16.01 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
16.25 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
16.56 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
17.01 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
17.05 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
17.56 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
18.01 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
18.61 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 63 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSA Employer-Proposed Wages 
 
CSA_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 23.89 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
24.01 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
24.30 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
24.63 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
27.10 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
27.79 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
28.60 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
29.36 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 64 
Frequencies and Distribution of CPROG Employer-Proposed Wages 
 
CPROG_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 16.80 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
17.23 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
17.69 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
17.74 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
19.15 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
19.95 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
21.29 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
21.98 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 65 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDA Employer-Proposed Wages 
SDA_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 20.60 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
21.72 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
22.62 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
23.18 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
24.30 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
25.06 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
26.09 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
26.85 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 66 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDS Employer-Proposed Wages 
SDS_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 26.32 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
27.28 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
27.29 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
27.65 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
28.87 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
29.38 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
30.60 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
31.34 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 67 
Frequencies and Distribution of DBA Employer-Proposed Wages 
DBA_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 21.59 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
22.05 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
22.62 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
23.34 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
24.94 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
25.99 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
26.29 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
27.24 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 68 
Frequencies and Distribution of NetSys Employer-Proposed Wages 
NetSys_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 23.26 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
23.27 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
23.54 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
23.87 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
25.52 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
26.25 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
27.27 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
28.28 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 69 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSUP Employer-Proposed Wages 
CSUP_Prop_$ 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 14.46 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
14.57 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
14.90 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
16.16 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
16.49 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
17.07 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
17.49 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
18.05 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 70 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSA Per-Employer Offers 
CSA_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 5.43 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
5.56 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
6.02 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
6.21 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
7.04 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
7.55 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
8.44 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
8.50 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 71 
Frequencies and Distribution of CPROG Per-Employer Offers 
CPROG_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 7.50 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
7.55 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
7.60 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
7.80 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
7.98 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
8.22 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
8.43 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
8.60 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 72 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDA Per-Employer Offers 
SDA_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 6.32 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
6.56 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
6.60 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
6.99 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
7.01 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
7.09 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
7.12 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
7.55 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 73 
Frequencies and Distribution of SDA Per-Employer Offers 
SDS_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.56 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
3.87 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
4.01 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
4.33 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
4.56 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
5.04 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
5.54 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
5.75 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
 
 
   
151 
Table 74 
Frequencies and Distribution of DBA Per-Employer Offers 
DBA_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 3.66 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
3.70 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
3.77 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
3.87 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
3.90 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
4.00 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
4.15 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
4.55 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 75 
Frequencies and Distribution of NetSys Per-Employer Offers 
Net_Sys_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 2.19 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
2.20 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
2.44 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
2.56 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
3.00 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
3.05 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
3.12 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
3.23 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
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Table 76 
Frequencies and Distribution of CSUP Per-Employer Offers 
CSUP_Offers 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 5.01 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 
5.43 1 12.5 12.5 25.0 
5.60 1 12.5 12.5 37.5 
6.01 1 12.5 12.5 50.0 
6.11 1 12.5 12.5 62.5 
6.67 1 12.5 12.5 75.0 
6.88 1 12.5 12.5 87.5 
6.90 1 12.5 12.5 100.0 
Total 8 100.0 100.0  
 
 
 
